I. The Myth of Reunification
While regional media and Middle East analysts often portray a post-Assad Syria as territorially unified—especially following reported agreements between Kurdish forces and factions aligned with former HTS commander Ahmad al-Sharaa—the reality on the ground remains far more fragmented and volatile. Stability is far from achieved, and state institutions remain largely absent. Fourteen years after the revolution began, the Syria that many dreamed of has yet to materialize.
Take Aleppo, for example. Although officially claimed by Damascus, large parts of the city are under the informal control of Isa al-Sheikh—better known as Abu Ahmad Zakour, a former HTS commander who defected two years ago. Zakour, previously targeted by HTS in the Aleppo countryside, recently reappeared in Damascus alongside transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa. A photo showing him with new Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra and members of the Bakara tribe confirms his reconciliation with the leadership, which occurred just before the “Repelling the Aggression” operation that toppled Assad on December 8.
Zakour played a pivotal role in the battle for Aleppo, coordinating with the pro-Iranian “Liwa al-Baqir” militia to eliminate regime commanders, including an Iranian advisor. Though he holds no official position, his relatives have secured high-ranking posts within the new security establishment.
Once HTS’s financial chief, Zakour fell out with the group over allegations of foreign collaboration. HTS arrested him in Azaz after he fled to Turkish-backed National Army territory, but Turkish military intervention led to his release. He was later evacuated to Turkey after sustaining injuries. The U.S. Treasury has sanctioned Zakour for allegedly funneling funds to HTS and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad through Istanbul-based Kublai Sari Ltd., naming him a key financial operator and advisory council member.
II. Competing Militias and Parallel Authorities in Aleppo and Idlib
Meanwhile, Liwa al-Baqir continues to operate in parts of Aleppo under Zakour’s guidance, despite being named after the fifth Shiite Imam and being predominantly Sunni due to tribal affiliations. In other districts—excluding the Kurdish-held Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood—General Fahim Isa of the Sultan Murad Division exercises control on behalf of the Damascus government and closely coordinates with Abu Amsha’s forces based in Hama.
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the battle for control over Syria remains far from settled. In Aleppo, the real power lies with Mohammad al-Jassim, known as “Abu Amsha,” a Turkmen commander from the Hama countryside who leads the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division within the Syrian National Army. Abu Amsha, who rose to prominence in 2016 and played a major role in the Afrin offensive in 2018, now controls Aleppo, despite being sanctioned by the U.S. for alleged human rights violations. While figures like HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani) maintain a presence in the city, Abu Amsha remains the de facto authority.
In Idlib, most of the western and central regions are administered by the anti-regime group Jabhat al-Shamiya, which holds substantial military and administrative sway. However, a small area in the northeastern part of Idlib is controlled by Liwa al-Baqir, a pro-regime militia led by Abu Ahmad Zakour. Their presence is limited but tactically significant, highlighting a complex patchwork of influence.
III. HTS Fragmentation, Power Reallocation, and Rise of Foreign Commanders
Ahmad al-Sharaa’s authority is increasingly challenged by powerful local commanders, including Abu Malik al-Talli—former emir of Qalamoun—who amassed vast wealth through smuggling and kidnapping. Al-Talli left HTS in 2020 and was later imprisoned under the direction of Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, a prominent commander from Deir Ezzor. Qahtani himself was arrested in 2023 during an internal purge targeting 700 HTS members accused of foreign espionage and was reportedly assassinated by ISIS.
Administrative appointments, such as overseeing customs at border crossings, have sidelined other commanders. Qutaiba and Hudhayfa al-Badawi, for example, now head Syria’s customs authority. Meanwhile, former Aleppo emir Abdulrahman Salama has transitioned into the construction business.
In 2020, HTS replaced its patchwork of local militias with 16 numbered brigades, placing the relatively low-profile Murhaf Abu Qasra as chief of staff. After the regime’s fall, he was named Minister of Defense—mirroring the role once held by Mustafa Tlass under Hafez al-Assad, whose symbolic influence belied a limited grip on military power.
Foreign nationals now hold key positions in the new military. Of the first six generals appointed in 2025, three were non-Syrians—a Jordanian, a Turk, and a Uyghur. Two of them now command elite units like the Republican Guard and the Damascus Division. Lacking social roots in Syria and considered unwelcome in their homelands, these foreign officers are entirely dependent on the Syrian leadership for survival—functioning much like the Circassian and Chechen guards used historically by the Jordanian monarchy.
Additionally, to avoid consolidating too much power within HTS, control over certain brigades in Idlib, Daraa, the central desert, and provinces like Aleppo and Rural Damascus has been handed to former rivals such as Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Sham, and Jabhat al-Shamiya.
IV. Regional Frontlines: Desert, Mountains, South, and Druze Autonomy
The army’s intelligence services, like military and air force intelligence, were very involved in keeping the peace in Syria, even when the country was at peace. However, Ahmad al-Sharaa wanted to set up a “civilian” security system long before Damascus fell. This system would be separate from the military wing of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In 2020, Anas Khattab, as previously mentioned, led the formation of the General Security Directorate. In March 2024, this body formally separated from HTS and continued operating as an institution affiliated with the “Syrian Salvation Government”—the civilian executive arm administering the Idlib region. Members of this institution, recognizable by their black uniforms, have since December 2024 taken primary responsibility for securing newly liberated areas.
In Homs, the situation is not much different. Parts of the province remain under Alawite control—similar to what has been observed in Latakia, Tartus, and other coastal provinces. Despite the massacres and provocations, many remnants of Assad’s forces and Alawite militias have relocated to the Alawite Mountains, a rugged and inaccessible area where HTS forces cannot easily concentrate their operations. Reports suggest that the Islamic Turkistan Party has now established a stronger presence in the region.
In the desert or Badiya region, both ISIS and Jund al-Aqsa maintain a presence. Although they previously operated as separate entities, they now appear to be moving toward unification. These groups’ military power has grown a lot thanks to getting access to weapons depots that Iran and Hezbollah used to control, trafficking Captagon, and buying oil from tribes that control areas like Al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor, and Mayadin. All this logistics activity takes place near the U.S. military base in al-Tanf. There are also reports suggesting that Abdul Rahman al-Makki—the missing emir of Jund al-Aqsa—still exerts influence over Salafi groups operating in the Badiya. ISIS and Jund al-Aqsa aim to penetrate Al-Bukamal, but for now, they are primarily using it as a corridor to Iraq, exploiting the tribal exchanges in Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal.
In southern Syria, Ahmad al-Awda—one of the key figures in the region and a former Free Syrian Army commander—reconciled with Russia and became the head of the “Eighth Brigade,” nominally affiliated with the Syrian army, while retaining a significant degree of autonomy. A native of Bosra al-Sham in Daraa province, al-Awda remains a major power broker in the south. During the fall of Damascus in December 2024, his forces were among the first to enter the capital, but they quickly returned to the south. He currently controls parts of Daraa, and there are growing speculations about his potential political role in post-Assad Syria. Some observers believe his influence will remain confined to the south and that he does not pose a direct threat to Ahmad al-Sharaa, the new leader of Syria. However, possible regional support from the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia could strengthen his position.
As for Sweida, the region remains under the control of Druze forces who maintain close ties with Druze communities in Lebanon, the Golan, and even Israel. These forces have so far prevented HTS from gaining a foothold in the area. Their spiritual leadership is in the hands of Sheikh al-Hijri, and according to local reports, they have not yet disarmed, maintaining both their border position with Jordan and connections with Israel. Alongside Awda and Hijri, Israel has expanded its influence deep into Syria, occupying large swathes of territory in Quneitra and Daraa provinces and possibly pushing further toward Sweida and from there toward al-Tanf and Al-Bukamal. These dynamics also extend to Syria’s border with Lebanon. In Qalamoun, near the Lebanese border, the region is largely self-administered by local residents, many of whom have ties to Jaysh al-Islam or even Ahmad al-Awda.
V. The Northeast Axis: SDF, Kurdish Fragmentation, and Foreign Calculations
In eastern and northeastern Syria, power remains in the hands of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite internal tensions between the SDF and the Kurdish National Council, the SDF continues to enjoy U.S. support and has managed to retain the backing of some Arab tribes. Due to the oil trade with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the SDF has consolidated its influence. The SDF has maintained its overall position despite ongoing internal conflicts between the Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga and PKK-aligned groups. Despite signing an agreement with Jolani’s forces in Damascus, the integration process has not yet materialized. The delay is partly due to ongoing political shifts in Turkey and partly due to clashes around the Tishrin Dam and in certain parts of Aleppo. In Aleppo, proximity to Liwa al-Baqir has so far ensured a degree of stability in Kurdish areas. The SDF continues to hold certain Arab-majority regions in hopes of negotiating over Afrin in the future. Some reports suggest that the presence of Liwa al-Baqir forces south of Tal Abyad and Manbij has eased tensions with the SDF. Ultimately, the Kurdish issue in Turkey remains a central focus, and the future trajectory of Syria could hinge on Ankara’s decision to intervene or remain silent.
This is a brief picture of what is left of a “united” Syria—a country that was once the playground of Iranian and Russian influence. In many ways, it still is. Russia has not evacuated its military bases, and Iran continues its silent expansion using Alawite networks, Liwa al-Baqir, remnants of the old army, and even invoking the 1986 agreement with the PKK. Russia maintains excellent relations with al-Awda, while Turkey, leveraging the Free Syrian Army, maybe the only country with confirmed influence within the Damascus-based power structure. Israel’s gradual territorial expansion is evident. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite their rhetorical support for al-Awda, maintain a cautious distance and continue to observe.
In this context, Ahmad al-Sharaa’s approach to preserving normalcy or unity in Syria remains murky and uncertain. He seems focused more on consolidating his rule in Damascus. His leadership carries Bonapartist and even Machiavellian undertones. Despite attempts to retain loyal commanders and allies, he has failed to unify Syria’s ethnic and sectarian divides. It may be difficult for him to achieve such a task without foreign assistance, and his position remains precarious. If he fails to maintain unity, the idea of Syria as a nation-state may collapse altogether. What appears on the map as the green-colored “Syrian state” is, in reality, a patchwork of territories divided among warlords, fighters, and tribes.
VI. Conclusion: A State in Shadow, A Map in Disguise
The fall of Assad may have reshaped Syria’s center, but it did not restore the state. What exists today is not a unified republic but a decentralized battlefield stitched together by fragile ceasefires, tribal loyalties, foreign militias, and regional calculations. The green borders on official maps are illusions—what defines Syria now are power corridors, smuggling routes, and zones of influence drawn by guns, not governance.
Ahmad al-Sharaa may sit in Damascus, but his rule is a patchwork of negotiations rather than authority. Without a cohesive national identity, inclusive political vision, or functional institutions, Syria risks becoming a permanent mosaic of warlords. The real map is not on paper. It’s on the ground—and it keeps changing.