Repercussions of the Presidential System: Issue 3
In the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), many democratization steps were taken alongside the reform process towards integration with the European Union. Over time AKP has moved away from democracy, and now it is generally accepted that the AKP governments have shown an increasingly oppressive tendency towards political rights and civil liberties.
Today, Turkey is considered one of the most polarized countries in the world, which has “experienced a significant democratic collapse” (Somer, 2019). The media world in Turkey has been polarizing in the last decade; readers and users have polarized on the axis of traditional and new media as well as pro-government and opposition or independent media channels (Konda 2016, 2019). The democratic backsliding, seen in both developing and developed democracies for the last 15 years, has become more evident since 2007 with the start of the second ruling period of the AKP. The year 2007 is also important in terms of being a turning point in which the “reorganization of media ownership,” the “discipline” of existing media organizations, and the “birth of the AKP media” began.
Media capture and democratic decline are interrelated processes. 2007, when media ownership began to change in Turkey, is also seen as a turning point at the beginning of the democratic decline. The democratic decline in Turkey has become more salient since 2007 but has deepened, especially after the 2016 coup attempt and the transition to the presidential system in 2017.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as President in 2014. In the two years from the Gezi Park protests (2013) to the June 7, 2015, general elections, a vital restructuring took place both in politics and in the media system in Turkey. Some commentators stated that in this period leading up to the elections and during the election process, an increasing “authoritarianization” was observed among AKP cadres.
The 2017 constitutional referendum established a new system of presidential government in Turkey that abolished the prime minister’s role and expanded the President’s executive powers. The June 2018 elections, normally scheduled for November 2019, were held under a state of emergency after the 2016 coup attempt. In the June 2018 general elections, which are seen as the “turning point” in the transition from the parliamentary system to the presidential system in Turkey’s political system, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the President by taking 52.6 percent of the votes in the first round and started his second term. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, the AKP combined with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to form the People’s Alliance, which received 53 percent of the votes and resulted in 344 seats. The main opposition CHP, together with the İyi Party and two smaller parties, formed the Nation Alliance, which received 34 percent of the votes and 189 seats. HDP entered the race alone and won 67 seats with 11 percent of the vote. The new presidential system, introduced in 2018, also increased the executive’s control over the judiciary.
In the 2019 municipal elections, candidates from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) won the local elections in Istanbul and Ankara after 20 years. It can be said that these election results challenged the AKP’s omnipotent position. However, the pressure on journalists, civil society, academia, and citizens continued to increase in 2019. Turkey ranked 159th in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index. The government has also expanded its attempts to control online news and information sources (Freedom House, 2020).
Current State of the Media
Mainstream media outlets in Turkey have moved to companies close to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2007 through the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). Media assets of the Central Group were seized in March 2007 and sold to the pro-AKP Çalık Group in December 2008. In 2013, the assets of this group were sold to the pro-AKP group of Zirve Holding, Kalyon Construction Company. According to this process called “pool media,” it was possible for the government to control the commercial media without resorting to the restrictive tools of the legal system by creating a media network that was sympathetic to the government.
As a result of this strategy, in addition to public service broadcasting and institutions such as the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), which are directly affiliated with the government, the old mainstream media tools, which were captured by business people close to the government, were reborn as media organizations that openly support government policies. The latest point reached in the process is the sale of Doğan Media Group to Demirören Group in 2018. More than 90 percent of the media in Turkey is now owned by big businesses that are attached to public tenders and have close personal ties to President Erdogan. It is observed that the media organs belonging to these companies reflect the government’s positions and often make the same headlines as the government-run media.
Until the 2013 Gezi Park protests, digitalization in the media had little effect on the polarization problem in print and visual media. As the widespread censorship in the media during the Gezi Park protests became visible, digital media platforms and technologies became more prominent in spreading the voices of the already existing civil opposition. Consequently, independent or opposition journalists have started to produce their news in digital media and reach their readers by using the internet and social media platforms instead of traditional media outlets. This process has accelerated the active participation of more citizens and journalists in producing information together.
Remarkably, the turbulent environment during and after the 2015 elections led to digitalization in the media, the emergence of an entrepreneurial spirit in journalism, and the participation of new players in the media system. Founded mostly by formerly mainstream journalists and published on the web or YouTube, a “post-mainstream” media environment has emerged thanks to these new media platforms.
Within three months of the Gezi protests, P24 was established in September 2013 as a non-governmental organization that aims to “enhance the capacity of the media, mobilize the public’s demand for media freedom, and support best practices for good journalism.” Diken was founded as a digital news platform in January 2014 by Harun Simavi, a 4th generation media giant Simavi family member. In 2015, a verification initiative, Share of Truth, was established under the auspices of the Association for Dialogue for a Common Future. Veteran journalist Ruşen Çakır’s coverage of the June 2015 general elections on social media led to the establishment of Medyascope on Periscope in August of the same year. An additional “digital news academy” network was established as a part of professional organizations such as TGS Turkey Journalists’ Union, P24 (NGO initiative), or digital platforms such as NewsLab Turkey. Having started to ensure a healthy news flow after the bomb attacks in 2016, Detay.org was born out as a social enterprise.
Although the final demise of the mainstream media after 2015 and the news media that were born in the digital space constitute an alternative for independent journalism, we can say that the current media environment reflects a transition period. It is not yet clear how the post-mainstream media will continue, which media will replace the mainstream, and whether the impact of digitalization can have a reparative or corrosive effect on the media. Media professionals continue their search for a sustainable business model, especially in the media born in the digital realm.
While conceptualizing the post-2015 period in the Turkish media system, the analytical tools provided by the concentration approach in media ownership will not be sufficient. In order to analyze the change and transformation that has taken place in the last few years, it is necessary to take a closer look at the concept of media capture. The democratic decline also affects the media industry globally, mainly through media capture strategies. While media concentration has been going on for decades in many countries, current strategies are considered more effective than previous methods due to the increasing number of business actors working with government officials to take over media outlets.
Since the 2010s, there has been a global trend toward democratic backsliding in new and established democracies worldwide. In the Freedom House 2022 report, it has been pointed out that there has been a decrease in the global freedoms category for 15 consecutive years. In this report, Turkey was ranked 32nd among 100 countries and was among the “non-free” countries. It is observed that the mainstream media is disappearing as a result of the polarization in both Turkey and other countries where media capture strategies are common.
In How Democracies Die (New York: Crown Publishing, 2019), Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt state that polarization is currently the greatest danger facing modern democracies and that it has emerged as “a consequence of the rise of populist and demagogic leaders.” Such leaders abuse their constitutional power to impose their decisions on other officials and civil society, including the media and business.
Media ownership consolidation problems have existed in many countries for decades, along with problems arising from the politicization of regulation strategies. The most extreme examples of media capture strategies in Europe can be seen in Hungary and Turkey.
Several factors fed the limitation of media freedom. First, the global financial crisis that began in 2008 has been the primary factor influencing the increasing fragility of the media. “Media capture” refers to how media organizations are subordinated to or possessed by powerful elite or class interests. The first way in this process is the concentration of property in the hands of the economic elite. This process started in Turkey in the 1990s. In the analysis of AKP’s increasing media dominance in the form of “legal pressures,” “takeovers,” and “financial restructuring” since 2007, the concept of “media capture” has come to the fore (Yeşil, 2018; Coşkun, 2020). Media capture refers to a “management problem” where political leaders and the media work in a “symbiotic” relationship, and media owners offer supportive news about political leaders in exchange for financial benefits such as government advertisements (Finkel, 2015).
In its current form, different “media capture strategies” are seen in different countries. In a study of more than one hundred countries (Dragomir, 2019), correlations were found in four areas of media capture in various countries: regulation, government funding (usually spent in the form of government advertising), control of public media, and control of the private property. Of these, control of the private property is the most important because it is the most difficult to achieve. Media capture occurs through direct and indirect mechanisms. The direct control mechanism is the actual takeover and closure of the media outlet whose assets have been transferred to state institutions. Indirect mechanisms include government subsidies, preferential distribution of government advertisements, tax breaks for media owners, cheap loans from state banks, and privatization deals.
There are four critical components to media capture, and all of them appear in Turkey. The first is the media’s seizure through regulations/regulatory institutions such as RTÜK. The second component stems from controlling public service media such as TRT. The third factor is the use of government funding as a control tool, as seen in the advertising strategies of the Press Advertisement Agency. The last component is in the form of ownership takeover, as was the role played by the TMSF in the formation and precedence of the pool media.
The AK Party’s methods of seizing the media are discussed in three categories. These are: seizing the media by creating their own private media, seizing the media with financial sanctions, and seizing the media by intimidating or criminalizing journalists (Coşkun, 2020: 643). Mass crackdowns on the media since 2007 have emerged as tax penalties, judicial pressure, discrediting journalists, online exile (internet censorship), and surveillance (Akser & Baybars- Hawks, 2012). Following the acquisition of the major mainstream media conglomerate Doğan Media group by the government-friendly Demirören Group in 2018, the process of taking over the mainstream media has been completed (Yeşil, 2018, Coşkun, 2020).
The impact of the democratic decline has deepened, especially after the 2016 coup attempt and the transition to the presidential system in 2017. As stated in the report published within the scope of the Free Web Turkey project carried out by the Media and Legal Studies Association between November 2019 and October 2020, the pressure on the media intensified after the coup attempt in 2016, and both journalists and many online and offline media outlets negatively affected. (https://www.freewebturkey.com/haberin-sonu)
In the six months following the July 15 coup attempt, a total of 178 media companies were closed, and the press cards of more than 700 journalists were revoked based on three statutory decrees (Journalists Without Borders, 2016). In the post-coup environment, AKP’s control over the internet and online media has tightened (Yeşil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). According to the reports of the Free Web Turkey Platform, which was established in 2019 to contribute to the fight against censorship and to raise awareness, the fact that blocking decisions on the news leads to growing censorship.
Although it is observed that international social media platforms have supported the fight against internet censorship, with the regulation made in July 2020, international content providers such as Facebook and Twitter, with more than one million daily users, are forced to appoint local representatives to Turkey and lift content within 48 hours if ordered (Freedom House, 2021). Especially after the transition to the Presidential Government System, the effectiveness of the Directorate of Communications has increased. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Turkey is the sixth country in the world to imprison the most journalists (18 journalists) in 2021.
In the Freedom of the Press Report in Turkey [2], the sharp rise of legal sanctions and especially RTÜK’s presuming and inhibitory role in the media as a censorship institution drew attention. The report also examines the factors that hinder freedom of the press under three categories. The first of these is legal restrictions. Closed media outlets and arrested and prosecuted journalists constitute the most visible areas of legal restrictions. For example, Olay, established on November 30, 2020, was closed 26 days after it started broadcasting due to the oppositional broadcasting policy. Except for Olay TV, it has been observed that the Radio and Television Supreme Council followed a “preventive” closure policy by keeping business people who applied for a license to broadcast stall for bureaucratic reasons. For example, Sözcü TV purchased the Sivas SRT channel on February 21, 2020, to broadcast nationally and applied to RTÜK for a name and logo change. However, RTÜK did not include this application on its agenda for months, the legal deadline was exceeded, and the file was implicitly rejected.
According to the Media and Law Studies Association 2021 report[3], there are currently 57 journalists and media workers in detention in Turkey. Journalists are generally sued based on five different laws: Turkish Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law, MIT Law, Banking Law, and Meetings and Demonstrations Law. Another legal restriction is the blocking of online content. According to the Disabled Web 2020 report, the total number of websites blocked in Turkey has reached the number of 46,701.
Access bans can be issued not only by judicial authorities but also by administrative bodies. According to the Freedom of the Press Report in Turkey (2021), another example of legal restrictions is broadcasting bans and penalties increasingly imposed by RTÜK.[4] While channels with dissident and critical broadcasting policies were penalized, channels that unconditionally supported the government’s policies were not subject to any penalties. In 2021, these practices of RTÜK had reflected the public. According to the report published by the CHP in 2021, it has been claimed that there is a relationship between the authoritarianism tendency and RTÜK’s broadcast suspension and administrative fines. This report showed that 72% of the 11,220 decisions signed by RTÜK between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2020, included penalties.
According to the Freedom of the Press Report in Turkey, it has been determined that 1234 decisions which are the 91% of the total 1363 screen blackouts made between 2014 to 2021, were realized after the transition to the presidential system. Another area of legal restriction is restrictions on social media platforms. According to the Twitter transparency report, the Turkish authorities made 10% of the total content removal requests worldwide during the July-December 2020 period. Twitter received 557 requests for content removal by Turkish courts and 3192 by other administrative authorities. The average of Twitter’s positive response to these requests was 34.7% for the 2012-2020 period.
The most striking development regarding social media restrictions has been the new social media law, which President Erdoğan himself announced. Some articles of the Law on the Regulation of Broadcasts on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed Through These Broadcasts, known as the social media law and passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on July 29, 2020, entered into force on October 1, 2020. Accordingly, social network providers with more than 1 million users must have a representative in Turkey. In contrast, gradual sanctions, ranging from fines to advertising bans, which may result in band reduction, have also been imposed on those who do not open a representative office in Turkey under this law. [5] In the first quarter of 2021, YouTube, Netflix, Twitter, and Facebook announced that they had appointed local representatives.
In May 2022, another draft law aimed at “fighting disinformation” was submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. While the bill included new regulations on social media and internet journalism, it was criticized by experts on the grounds that it would lead to censorship and numerous penalties. The bill introduced new rules, such as making it mandatory for media organizations broadcasting on the internet to include their workplace address, trade name, e-mail address, contact phone, and electronic notification address, and classifying them as periodicals. It also required social media representatives of foreign platforms to reside in Turkey (June 16, 2022). This bill was approved by the House Justice Committee in May 2022 but has not been reintroduced to the parliamentary agenda yet.
According to the Freedom of the Press Report in Turkey (2021), economic dependency is the second main factor that restricts the freedom of the press. Although it is not possible to talk about independent mainstream media, small-scale oppositional media continues to exist. However, internet media, especially trying to maintain independent journalism, has not yet reached a sustainable income model. Digitally born independent media platforms, which need funds to survive from foundations and non-governmental initiatives abroad, faced criticism from government circles and some nationalist circles in 2021.
In the summer of 2021, two issues concerning digital media came to the fore: digital media outlets receiving foreign funding or donations and the fight against misinformation in social media. In July, the online news portal Oda TV published a news report featuring the names of institutions in Turkey that received a grant from the US-based Chrest Foundation, sparking the debate on the ethics of independent journalism on social media. Medyascope, which received nearly half a million US dollars in donations between 2016 and 2020 and made this information publicly available on its website, was criticized by some journalists for “unethically getting paid.” While other journalists expressed their support because the media “needs such grants to survive” [6]. The Head of the Directorate of Communications, Fahrettin Altun, declared that he considered foreign funds given to the media as a kind of political espionage attempting to influence Turkish democracy and that new regulation is made in this regard [7].
Another problem regarding the economic independence of the media is the distribution of public advertisements through the Press Advertisement Agency in an increasingly partisan manner. The Press Advertisement Institution is affiliated with the Directorate of Communications, and mostly pro-government media are rewarded with these funds. Moreover, the Press Advertisement Agency reports have been kept confidential and not shared with the public since the transition to the presidential system.
The Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) [8] is updated every year and provides essential data on media pluralism in Turkey. In the updates made in 2020, it has been pointed out once again that RTÜK acts as a tool of the government to silence the critical and independent media in Turkey, with the penalties given to news organizations that criticize the government. The analysis of MOM 2020 identifies the political pressures and controls against press freedom and, thus, the media sector in Turkey. For example, the owners of 8 of the ten most read newspapers, 9 of the most watched TV channels, and 7 of the ten most read news portals have relations with the government (political or economic). Since national newspapers’ online editions are among the top 10 most viewed websites, almost all online news content follows a homogeneous publishing policy.
The Independent Communications Network (BIA) has been monitoring and reporting freedom of expression violations since 2001. [9] The 2018 report stated that Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code, which became widely used due to publications and thoughts about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after he was elected as President, formed the basis for at least 54 journalists to be sentenced to prison, suspended imprisonment and fines until January 1, 2019. Also, in 2018, at least 20 journalists were sentenced to 38 years, five months, and four days in prison (6 years, ten months, and 12 days of this punishments are suspended) and subject to a judicial fine of 35 thousand TL for criticizing President Erdoğan or making accusations against him through news or articles.
In the 2019 report, it is stated that the legal pressures on the press are not limited to the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and the Anti-Terror Law (TMK). Other methods such as canceling press cards, Press Advertisement Agency releases (BİK), Capital Markets Law (SPK), and Banks Law have also been used. According to the 2019 report, the law of “insulting the President” continued to serve as a tool to prosecute and punish journalists. Although the conditions of the state of emergency are left behind, freedom of the press has been damaged by various practices such as home raids, forcing into exile, and issuing arrest warrants with a red notice abroad against opponent journalists. In 2019, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) imposed 57 fines and 24 program suspensions on TV companies for broadcasting news, movies, and programs.
According to the BIA Media Monitoring Reports published in 2020, 23 journalists were accused based on articles of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), such as “insult,” “membership in a terrorist organization,” and “aiding without being a member of a terrorist organization” or “espionage” as well as the “propaganda of a terrorist organization” regulation of Anti-Terror Law (TMK), the MIT Law and the Military Penal Code. They were sentenced to a total of 103 years and three days of imprisonment. In addition, the Press Advertisement Institution (BİK) imposed a total of 276 days of cutting advertisements punishment for the newspapers Sözcü, Evrensel, BirGün, Cumhuriyet, and Korkusuz due to their critical publications in 2020. Throughout the year, RTÜK imposed fines of 19.063.835 TL in total on the media, including critical channels such as Fox TV, Tele 1, and Halk TV. It has been pointed out that from August 2014, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as President, to January 1, 2021, at least 63 journalists were sentenced to imprisonment, suspended imprisonment, or fines based on Article 299 of the Penal Code (TCK) titled “insulting the President.”
According to BIA Media Monitoring Reports, 35 journalists were sentenced to 92 years in prison in 2021, and at least 41 journalists were detained. In the same year, journalists were prosecuted on charges of making “propaganda of terrorist organization,” “insulting,” and “insulting the President.” Turkey was ranked 153rd among the 180 countries according to RSF (Reporters Sans Frontier) World Press Freedom Index. In 2021, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), the Press Advertisement Institution (BİK), the Press Card Commission and the Criminal Courts of Peace and similar institutions and tools, which are called “self-controllers” and expected to be impartial, could not fulfill their duties. They are used to seize the media and bring critical journalists and media organizations to their knees.
Media ombudsman Faruk Bildirici announced that a total of 803 days of advertisement cutoff was imposed on newspapers in 2020. On October 13, 2021, CHP’s Bülent Tezcan submitted a bill to abolish the Press Advertisement Agency’s (BİK) authority to cut off official releases and advertisements. In 2021, RTÜK also penalized critical or questioning organizations such as Fox TV, Halk TV, Tele1, and KRT. RTÜK member İlhan Taşçı announced that while these organizations were given 71 fines amounting to 21 million 500 TL, no action was taken against the channels that support the government “despite 100 thousand complaints”. It was also pointed out that 975 news articles published on the internet in 2021 were blocked by the decision of the Criminal Courts of Peace or the Access Providers Association.
Conclusion
After the 20-year rule of AKP governments, the media world in Turkey has been highly polarized in the political spectrum and the traditional-new media axis. Despite rising levels of internet use among the adult population, traditional television remains the dominant media for accessing the news. In its annual report on Turkey (2020: 78), the EU Commission expressed “serious concern about the lack of transparency of media financing, the concentration of media ownership, the political influence on editorial policies, restrictions on freedom of expression, and the lack of independence of regulatory institutions.” In the report, it was stated that there was no “progress” in “alignment with the EU acquis” in the media sector, and that “the concentration of media organizations in the hands of a few holding groups with strong ties to the government or under public contracts poses a threat to free and independent media.”
2007, when media ownership began to change in Turkey, is also seen as a turning point at the beginning of the democratic decline (Yanardağoğlu, 2022). The democratic decline in Turkey has become more pronounced since 2007 but has deepened, especially after the 2016 coup attempt and the transition to the presidential system in 2017. While analyzing the media in Turkey in the post-2015 period, we stated that the analytical tools provided by the concentration approach in media ownership would not be sufficient. In our analysis, the concept of media seizure is examined more closely.
We mentioned above the four essential components in the seizure of the media and stated that all of these elements are seen in Turkey. The first is the media’s seizure through regulation/regulatory institutions such as RTÜK. The second component consists of controlling public service media such as TRT. The third factor is the use of state funding as a control tool, as seen in the advertising strategies of the Press Advertisement Agency. The last component takes place in the form of ownership takeover, as well as the role played by the SDIF in the formation and precedence of pool media (Dragomir, Marius, 2019).
One of the media capture strategies seen in various countries is that companies close to the government start buying more media outlets one or two years before the elections. As such, the media takeover strategy is a purely “electional” strategy to ensure that media outlets help guarantee elections are won. If these elites lose the elections, they will also lose access to these resources. Therefore, media takeovers are often used to ensure electoral victory and self-continuation. Prior to the 2023 elections, the fact that institutions such as the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) and the Press Advertisement Institution (BİK), which are called “self-controllers” and expected to be impartial, keep the media under control through regulations, and this continues to cause concern.
Despite the growing trend toward polarization and politicization of the media, online media remains vibrant. According to the 2020 “We are Social” report, there are 62.7 million internet users and 54 million social media users in Turkey. Internet users (ages 16-74) make up 79.0% of the adult population and are online for more than 7 hours a day. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute data, internet penetration has reached 90% of households.
The International Press Institute’s (IPI) report, published in March 2021, began with the statement, “The digital space remains the primary refuge for independent journalism.” It was found out that the digital reach of the independent media ran up to 33.5 million users while the pro-government media reached 47.8 million users. In addition, independent media receive 16.5% more engagement on social media than highly centralized pro-government media.
With the collapse of the mainstream media in Turkey, the media takeover has been completed in the last five years. Within the scope of this strategy, it is not difficult to predict that the pressure on the media will increase in the process of the 2023 elections. However, it should not be ignored that online platforms fill a significant gap in access to information unless controlled by strict regulations. As experts have pointed out, Turkey is one of the most extreme examples of a media takeover. Especially after 2016, the Erdogan government controls almost all media, with regulators and public and commercial media changes. Policy solutions are essential in the fight against media capture. However, policy-making and regulations are also part of the problem in such regimes. Therefore, much greater investment is needed in independent news organizations that can produce forms of critical journalism and better reach and interact with large audiences.
Resources
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[7] Cumhuriyet, 22 Temmuz 2021, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiyede-bazi-medya-kurulusların-fon-almasi-tartismalara-neden-oldu-1854591
[8] https://m.bianet.org/bianet/medya/254428-turkiye-de-medya-verilerle-sahipler-bulgularla-seffaflik-ve-yogunlasma Sinem Aydınlı 8 aralık 2021
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Fotoğraf: Julius Drost