Turkey and Israel have gradually entered into an intense rivalry that spans spiritual, economic, and geopolitical domains, placing the two nations in confrontation. Leveraging regional developments, Israel has expanded its influence into areas previously dominated by Turkey. Perhaps the furthest frontier of this rivalry is Central Asia and the Turkic countries of the region, where Turkic countries recently signed a $12 billion agreement with the European Union, demonstrating its commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550. By refusing to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and appointing an ambassador to Nicosia, Israel has further widened the gap between its interests and those of Turkey.
At first glance, this policy might seem like an EU maneuver targeting Turkey’s cultural sphere and Russia’s backyard. However, it primarily reflects the West’s efforts to expand relations within the framework of the Abraham Accords, which are gaining strength in the Near East, competing with the Caspian Pact influenced by China, Russia, and Turkey. Israel is capitalizing on opportunities arising from Iran’s weakening and Turkey’s regional ascendance to bolster its influence. This expansion, particularly in West Asia, could lead to a broader confrontation between the two countries in the future.
Turkey and Israel in Syria
Both countries had issues with the Bashar al-Assad regime. Turkey, by supporting anti-Assad groups and strengthening Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, gradually expanded its influence through emerging opportunities and toppled the Damascus regime. As Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham entered key Syrian regions, Lebanese Hezbollah forces withdrew, and pressure on Palestinian groups intensified. In Syria’s coastal areas, Alawites faced suppression due to their sectarian ties to the previous regime. Iran’s retreat from the scene, driven by successive defeats and Israeli strikes, allowed Turkey—one of the key players in the Syrian crisis—to solidify its positions. This consolidation, facilitated under the cover of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, was and remains a source of discontent for Israel. The provocation of Druze communities and forces loyal to Ahmad al-Awda in Daraa and Suwayda, coupled with rising ethnic and sectarian tensions, enabled Israel to exploit Syria’s chaotic situation, seizing critical areas near the Golan Heights and close to Damascus.
Israel’s support for the Druze, despite Turkey’s endorsement of an agreement between Mazloum Kobani, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and Ahmad al-Shara, leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, added complexity to the situation. At the Qamishli congress, Kurds, mindful of Israel’s pivotal role, remain hesitant about unity and establishing a nationwide government in Syria. This discord between Turkey and Israel, despite U.S. efforts to reduce tensions, is deeply rooted and has strengthened the position of the YPG, a branch of the PKK. While Ankara seeks to resolve the Kurdish issue domestically through peaceful means, urging the PKK to disarm and embrace comprehensive peace, external actors like Israel and even Iran—which had limited ceasefire and control agreements with the PKK in 1986—use the Syrian Democratic Forces and YPG to undermine Turkey’s position.
Israel pursues a long-term strategy by expanding its influence in southern Syria and linking it to areas controlled by Mazloum Kobani, targeting not only Iraq and Syria but also Turkey and Iran. While this goal appears idealistic at present, Israel’s David Corridor remains a significant obstacle, placing Ankara in serious conflict with Tel Aviv. Israeli military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai writes in Yedioth Ahronoth: “Israeli security institutions are concerned about Turkey’s efforts to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Assad regime. The Israeli regime fears that a Sunni-Muslim Brotherhood axis led by Turkey could replace the Shia axis led by Iran.”
It was expected that Ankara would provide greater support to Syrian Turkmen, but following the fall of the Assad regime, the Turkmen have become increasingly isolated. A policy similar to that applied against Turkmen in Iraq has been implemented in Syria, weakening their position between the Qamishli and Damascus axes. This situation also applies to other ethnic and religious groups, but Kurds, Druze, and Alawites because of external influences, have not been integrated into the government structure, though this has diminished their long-term influence in power structures.
Syria is becoming a central battleground in the competition for Eastern Mediterranean energy resources. The shifting power dynamics, particularly along its coast, are reshaping regional balances. Ankara continues to be alarmed by Israel’s expanding influence in southern Syria.
Azerbaijan
The relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan is profoundly deep and rooted. Turkey played a significant political, strategic, and military role in supporting Azerbaijan’s efforts to liberate territories occupied by Armenia during the Karabakh War. This role was carefully managed to avoid provoking Russia while also striving to prevent conflicts of interest with Israel. Turkey-Azerbaijan relations, independent of the Israel issue, have a historical character and have been further strengthened by rising nationalism in Turkey. Ilham Aliyev’s extensive investments in Turkey and the participation of Turkish companies in Karabakh’s reconstruction are examples of this relationship.
These relations experienced tensions in the pre-Erdoğan era (e.g., Süleyman Demirel’s complaints about some Azerbaijani officials supporting the PKK or Turgut Özal’s failure to deliver helicopters to Azerbaijan). However, by focusing on the threat of Iranian influence in Azerbaijan, Baku maintained a balanced policy between Ankara and Tel Aviv. The Karabakh War acted as a catalyst, drawing these three parties closer while maintaining Iran’s distance. Ilham Aliyev even mediated extensively in diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Turkey. However, these rapprochements did not satisfy Turkey and Israel regarding their controlled influence in Azerbaijan. The shared threat of Iran did not alter Turkey’s historical stance against Israel, and their rivalry intensified, particularly after October 7. Despite domestic protests in Turkey against trade with Israel, pressure from Baku ensured the continuation of oil transfers to Israel via Turkey. This rivalry, with temporary oversight of interests and conflicts in Azerbaijan, has spread to other regions.
Iraq
Israel’s influence in Iraq, particularly in the Kurdistan Region, began in the 1940s and 1950s. Israel maintains strong ties with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (the Barzani family) and was the only country to support the 2017 independence referendum in the Kurdistan Region. Israeli foundations like MASHAV and charitable organizations such as Springs of Hope conduct extensive activities in the region. These ties encompass intelligence and security cooperation, military training for Peshmerga forces, and Mossad’s presence in Kurdish areas for intelligence operations targeting Iran, Syria, and Iraq. Israel has also provided symbolic humanitarian aid to the region through organizations like IsraAID. Leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party have expressed their desire to establish formal relations with Israel, viewing this connection as a tool to enhance their regional power against Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara.
In contrast, the Barzani family’s relations with Turkey have strengthened since the early 2010s, particularly after the 2013 oil agreement. The Kurdistan Region began independently exporting oil through Turkey’s Ceyhan port without Baghdad’s approval. This rapprochement was supported by the Justice and Development Party and the Barzanis’ personal ties with Erdoğan. Joint investments include oil and energy exports through companies like Kar Group, the participation of major Turkish firms like Limak and Cengiz in infrastructure projects in Erbil and Duhok, the development of transport and trade at the Ibrahim Khalil crossing, and the Barzani family’s investments in luxury real estate projects in Istanbul and Ankara. These relations provide Turkey with strategic and energy advantages and the Barzanis with political support and significant economic benefits.
The illegal presence of the YPG in Iraq and the Erbil government’s silence regarding Turkish military strikes on PKK positions indicate both the Barzanis’ satisfaction with this situation and Turkey’s efforts to counter Israeli and Iranian influence. While the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan aligns with Iran and Iraq’s central government close to Tehran, Barzani is a focal point for maintaining influence in both Ankara and Tel Aviv. The weakening of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, the marginalization of Arshad al-Salihi, and interference in the selection of the front’s leader, along with the expansion of Shia and Sunni divides among Turkmen, have bolstered the influence of Hashd al-Shaabi and strengthened Iran. Tehran links the PKK in Iraq, but Israel prioritizes PKK branches in Syria. The rivalry between Turkey and Israel continues over greater influence in Erbil, and Erbil’s policy, similar to Baku’s, weakens Tehran while balancing Israel and Turkey. However, the expansion of Tel Aviv-Erbil relations remains a threat to Turkey’s interests, and the PKK’s continued presence in northern Iraq could be a factor in proxy conflicts for both sides.
Central Asia
As mentioned initially, Israel has made significant investments in Central Asia. Despite the historical and cultural proximity of these countries to Turkey and their unification under the Organization of Turkic States, recent developments indicate that this region has also become a theater of competition between Turkey and Israel. The region’s importance is amplified by its energy resources and proximity to Russia and China. Iran’s declining influence in the region, due to misguided policies and religious strategies, has created opportunities for Israel.
Israel’s International Development Cooperation Agency (MASHAV) undertakes extensive projects in Central Asia, and the Shalom Club network, particularly active in Uzbekistan, is highly engaged. Israel has military agreements with Kazakhstan, and companies like Elbit and IAI maintain strong ties with Astana in developing drone technology. The opening of an Israeli embassy in Turkmenistan recently further demonstrates Tel Aviv’s expanding influence.
Despite the presence of tens of thousands of Jews in these countries and the dispatch of labor to Israel, Turkey enjoys greater historical affinity, but this has not significantly influenced the largely non-democratic governments of the region. While both countries operate in the region’s energy sector and aim to create an alternative to Iran through Azerbaijan, recent developments suggest that the West, particularly Europe, prioritizes Israel’s influence over Turkey’s. Israel sources 25% of its oil from this region, with the majority of the remainder coming from Azerbaijan. Turkey is also dependent on the region’s energy, and in the energy transfer hub of Azerbaijan, both sides engage in intense competition and power projection at the source and transit points.
In March of this year, a group of 50 rabbis in the U.S. met with Donald Trump, signaling the expansion of the Abraham Accords to Turkic countries, including Azerbaijan and some Central Asian states. In May, a conference titled “Abraham Accords: An Opportunity for Transformation in Central Asia and Azerbaijan” highlighted Azerbaijan’s role in facilitating Central Asian countries’ accession to the accords. The Silk Road Research Institute in the U.S. also reported that Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords could reshape geopolitical connections with Central Asia, extend U.S. initiatives to Kazakhstan’s shores, and halt China’s commercial hegemony in Western Eurasia. Such an agreement could reduce India’s isolation in Central Asia, weaken China and Pakistan, and diminish Turkey’s influence in the region.
Mediterranean
Israel’s efforts to bypass Turkey’s energy routes and expand relations with Egypt and Greece exert pressure on a geopolitical and strategic area close to Turkey. Ben-Yishai writes in Yedioth Ahronoth: “Turkey’s primary goal in its presence in Syria is to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy and gas routes. Turkey aims to obstruct Israel and Egypt’s gas-related economic plans, seeking not only to control offshore gas fields but also to prevent Eastern Mediterranean countries from trading gas with Europe. This country is the main obstacle to the creation of an undersea gas pipeline to transport Egyptian and Israeli gas to Europe, and this could be the primary cause of a confrontation between Israel and Turkey.”
Tensions have escalated since assessments revealed the Eastern Mediterranean’s vast gas reserves. For nearly two decades, drilling operations have been conducted in the region’s gas fields. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the Eastern Mediterranean holds approximately 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil reserves. Key gas fields include the Zohr field off Egypt’s coast (30 trillion cubic feet), the Leviathan field opposite Haifa (18 trillion cubic feet), the Tamar field off the coasts of Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Gaza (over 10 trillion cubic feet), and the Aphrodite field in Cyprus’s waters (8 trillion cubic feet). Undiscovered fields are estimated to hold up to 60 trillion cubic feet. Companies such as Italy’s Eni in Egypt and Cyprus, France’s Total in Cyprus, the U.S.’s Noble Energy on the occupied Palestinian coast, and Russia’s Novatek in Lebanon are conducting drilling operations. Turkey also drills off the coast of Turkish Cyprus, asserting it as the right of Turkish Cypriots.
Israelis believe that one of Turkey’s primary objectives in maintaining a military presence and bases in Syria is to secure its position along energy corridors and control gas fields. This activity was recently halted temporarily by Israel’s preemptive operation to destroy Syrian airbases that Turkey planned to utilize. The coastal region in question is of strategic importance to Ankara, not only as a gateway for maritime agreements but also as a resource-rich area. By 2019, Syria had reported approximately 40 trillion cubic feet of gas in five offshore blocks. Turkey does not recognize the maritime boundary agreements between Cyprus and Israel (2010) and Egypt and Cyprus (2013). Israel’s efforts in Cyprus demonstrate Tel Aviv’s determination to use this issue as a domestic pressure tool against Turkey. With its “Blue Homeland” project, Turkey employs a powerful lever against Israel’s energy expansionism. Resolving energy boundary issues among Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey could position Turkey as the dominant drilling power in the region, extending even to Lebanon, while Azerbaijan, Turkey’s close ally, has limited its energy investments in Israel.
Turkey’s strategy in Syria closely resembles its approach in Libya. Following a 2019 agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj, Ankara secured a new Exclusive Economic Zone and energy exploration rights in vast areas of the Eastern Mediterranean. This agreement weakened Greece’s maritime boundary claims over its islands, including Crete, and contributed to halting the EastMed pipeline, a joint Israeli-Greek-Cypriot project to transport natural gas to Europe.
Future: Iran
Despite the tensions and conflicts between Turkey and Israel, their relations have not completely deteriorated. During Tansu Çiller’s tenure, when Europe imposed an arms embargo on Turkey due to the PKK issue, Israel was the only country to assist Turkey. However, today, Turkey’s formidable influence across the region—from Ukraine and the Black Sea to Russia, Central Asia, Arab countries, and North Africa—has made it a potential rival, even an adversary, for Israel. The pinnacle of these tensions is the Iran issue. Despite serious disagreements with Tehran, Turkey has maintained political and economic relations and supported Tehran on numerous international issues, including nuclear and economic matters, though Tehran has not shown the necessary sincerity toward Ankara regarding the PKK.
As the noose tightens around Iran and the drums of war grow louder, scenarios for a post-war Iran are emerging. The author is firmly opposed to any foreign attack on Iran, but what would happen if such an event occurred? Israel has invested heavily in this scenario, aiming to replace post-Khamenei Iran with a regime aligned with Tel Aviv’s interests. Israel’s intense propaganda, combined with Iran’s significant internal policy missteps, has created an artificial and abnormal popularity for Netanyahu and his war propaganda machine in Iran, despite his widespread massacres in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. In contrast, Turkey, through its soft power, has cultivated cultural influence among Iran’s Turks and Kurds for years.
The question is, if such a situation arises, would Turkey and Israel, already clashing in various regions, exploit Iran’s cultural dynamics and widespread discontent to take action? Does Israel’s push to reach Iran’s borders signify this? Could the Turkish and Kurdish factors in Iran make Turkey a more prominent player in this scenario, either as an intervener or an obstacle? In such a case, with the spread of this fire through various groups to Iraq or Turkey, what would Azerbaijan’s stance be? Will we witness a confrontation between Turkey and Israel in the Iranian theater in the future? God forbid if a war breaks out in Iran, would Ankara’s stance toward Iran mirror its positions in Iraq and Syria, or would Ankara strive to prevent such a war?
Perhaps the answer lies at the end: Ankara’s efforts are focused on preventing war in its neighborhood and engaging in the Iran issue, a scenario that aligns more with Israel’s preferences. Humanitarian issues, migration, and insecurity could plunge Turkey into crisis, but not Israel. The situation is yet another potential flashpoint between Ankara and Tel Aviv. If there is a shred of wisdom in Tehran, this issue could be forgotten or deferred to a distant future. Previously, Turkey was a battleground for conflicts between Iran and Israel; will Iran become a battleground for the parties in the future?