Turkey’s successful gamble in Syria has opened many opportunities for the Turkish government on both domestic and international fronts.
The scale of this victory, achieved despite years of doubt over whether the opposition stronghold in Idlib would hold against the Syro-Russian rocket barrages and attempts at invasion, obstructed only by the Turkish military presence, must result in the consolidation of power at home.
The opposition parties calling for the withdrawal of Turkey from Syria and negotiations with Assad (the latter also proposed by the government circles) now need to drastically change their rhetoric and acknowledge their lack of better judgment.
At the same time, the Kurdish DEM Party, for years advocating for support for Rojava, may soon lose this southern ally, becoming even more isolated, hence their much more complacent stance in the last rounds of talks with the PKK.
Meanwhile abroad, Turkey, until recently often portrayed as a warmonger fuelled by the neo-Ottoman dreams became a kingmaker (or president-maker?), an important regional actor adept in cold calculation, and the bridge between the West and the new government in Damascus.
However, the danger of such a snap and overwhelming victory is, as history teaches us, that one can easily get drunk on it, cast aside realpolitik, restraint, and concern for international law and human rights in favor of grandiose visions of greater glories to come.
In this article, leaving all the glory and triumph aside, I would like to focus on a few real-life challenges and opportunities Turkey faces due to the new Syrian opening. As I do not believe that politics, domestic or foreign, is divorced from morality, I will talk not only about issues arising from political realism but also those much more normative, related to human rights and freedoms.
The Rojava Quagmire
Rojava’s future has immediately become a major problem on domestic and international levels. Damascus and Ankara want the para-polity to disappear from the map as soon as possible and the only factor preventing a full-scale armed conflict is the American presence and guarantees to PYD due to its involvement in the anti-IS coalition. The ultimatum given to SDF involves its submission to the national government in Damascus, as well the voluntary exile of “international terrorists,” meaning PKK-affiliated Kurds from other countries.[1] The SDF leader Mazlum Abdi has swiftly declared that “we [SDF and Damascus] agree that we are for the unity and integrity of Syrian territory and reject any division projects that threaten the country’s unity,”[2] However, it seems unlikely that Rojava will outright abandon autonomy. Rather, they will push for its legalization under the new regime.
Becoming an intermediary in these negotiations would offer Turkey a great opportunity to win over Syrian Kurds. Instead of further escalation of bombing and attacks by the Turkish military and affiliated SNA, by offering assistance, Ankara could win over a former foe (assuming a Turkish-centric version of history in which Rojava’s main goal is to flank Turkey, which likely is not the case) and break off an important element of the PKK-related network in neighboring countries. A diplomatic solution would be more peaceful and more cost-effective and as a gesture of goodwill towards Kurds, should lead to a better rapport with DEM at home, not to mention the international opinion in left-wing and liberal circles.
The Alawite Connection
There is no point in pretending that the Assad regime was not an Alawite-centred regime. It was and people from the Alawite sect (Arab Alawite – Nusayri, not Anatolian Alawis) remain the strongest supporters of the old regime and opponents of the HTS takeover. However, this opposition seems to be born more of distrust than outright hatred. The previous coups and conflicts at home and in neighboring countries have taught Alawites that they may become a target and subject to random acts of violence or even organized attempts at ethnic cleansing. It seems that so far while rising such violence is sporadic and aimed mostly against officers of the old regime, especially those high-ranked and with a documented history of persecution of opposition. Still, some sources report up to 150 Alawites killed by the militias associated with HTS.[3]
So far, in Turkey, the pledge of Syrian Alawites is mostly heard by their cousins in Hatay, who repost and translate the social media accounts of violence but without much verification, as posts on X include a mix of old and new footage as well as written stories missing supporting evidence. In the national discourse, the only echo is the term “political Alawite” (“siyasal Alevi”) used as a vague slur used against opposition politicians and opposition-leaning media figures by known government trolls.[4] Rather than antagonizing them, Turkey could easily insert itself as a protector of Syria’s Alawites. Through its connection with HTS, it could facilitate the deployment of Turkish or international observers to Tartus and Latakia, ensuring peaceful integration of Alawite regions with the rest of the country and earning appreciation from its own Alawite citizens.
Human Rights Protection
In a similar vein, Turkey could provide observers or military police to patrol other regions across Syria where the authority of the new government does not reach or is too weak to effectively enforce peaceful relations between various groups, militias, and ex-soldiers. It is hard to imagine that in its current state, HTS would oppose such a proposition. While Turkey itself does not have a stellar human rights record, it still is in a much better position to provide such assistance to Syria which was not so long ago a war-torn dictatorship.
Turkish dedication to peacebuilding and protection of ethnic, religious, and other minorities would not only improve its image in Syria but also globally. More than that, this would ultimately prove that exalted speeches on human rights and democracy for Syria aired during the war were not only a useful excuse to get involved in the conflict but a real motivation for the government.
Regional Integration
This opportunity created by developments in Syria is not a secret to anybody following Turkey’s economic relations with neighboring countries. Turkey should quickly benefit from its extremely good standing with the new regime, especially concerning contracts for the reconstruction of the war-torn infrastructure and being the middleman in two-way trade in various goods, including oil, agricultural produce, and others. However, Turkey would benefit even more from an early proposal of formal economic or even (one day) political cooperation with Syria. The time is now as over the following months, other states of the region will with no doubt court the Syrian government with similar propositions, now that the new country so hungry for credit, investments, and trade is seemingly opening a new, democratic chapter. As Turkey is not an oil-rentier state of the Gulf or an economic titan like the EU, capitalizing on this initial rapport can be the only way for it to ensure that it will be a primary partner for the new Syria. What is more, such a bilateral agreement could over time become increasingly complex and might even lead to the development of a regional organization where Turkey would play the key role, with Lebanon and Iraq being next in line for membership. Thus, Turkey’s desired post-Ottoman influence could be achieved via EU-style regional integration, with diplomacy and trade, not military might, becoming the primary tools of its foreign policy.
The Case for Free Cross-Border Movement
This final challenge ties to the previous ones mentioned in the article. As of now, the movement of Syrians across the border is only in one direction – once the former refugees leave Turkey for Syria, there is no coming back, at least not officially. So far, 52 thousand Syrians have moved back home, according to the Minister of the Interior Ali Yerlikaya.[5] There were mixed responses to these numbers on the domestic political scene, with many nationalist politicians calling for the forced deportation of Syrians as the war is over. I would argue that such low return numbers are mostly due to its irrevocable effects – once you cross, you cannot come back. Allowing for the back-and-forth travel for Syrians would most likely increase the numbers of returnees since many do not know in what state their houses and companies are and will not risk their new lives in Turkey to learn it on their own. Free movement of people would also help jump-start the trade between the countries and, once the immediate damage of the war is cleared and the internal situation more stable, for the quick development of tourism. After all, Turkey and Syria could both agree to a freedom of movement agreement, also allowing Turkish businesspeople and tourists to visit their southern neighbors without hassle.
Turkey’s Next Chapter in Syria
In conclusion, the evolving situation in Syria presents Turkey with a unique set of challenges and opportunities. From mediating the future of Rojava and addressing the concerns of Syrian Alawites to championing human rights and fostering regional integration, Turkey has the chance to redefine its role on the global stage. However, these possibilities come with significant responsibilities. Ensuring that its actions align with principles of peace, stability, and international cooperation will be crucial in shaping its legacy in Syria and beyond.
While these opportunities are promising, many uncertainties remain. The fragmented nature of militias and organizations operating outside governmental control, coupled with the absence of a constitutional framework, complicates discussions about Turkey’s long-term role in Syrian politics. As these dynamics evolve, Turkey’s ability to adapt and navigate these complexities will determine how effectively it can contribute to the region’s stability and its own strategic goals. By prioritizing diplomacy over military might and demonstrating a commitment to rebuilding and reconciliation, Turkey could not only secure its interests but also help usher in a more stable and cooperative Middle East.
[1] Fidan’dan Fransa’ya Suriye mesajı: “Muhatabımız ABD, arkasına takılan ülkeler değil.” BBC News Türkçe. January 8, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cd9x13y2q90o
[2] “SDF chief says they reject Syria’s division”. Rudaw. January 8, 2025. https://manage.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/080120254
[3] “Syrian Above All: The Alawite Community Refuses to Pay for Assad’s Crimes.” France24, January 13, 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250113-syrian-above-all-the-alawite-community-refuses-to-pay-for-assad-crimes; United Nations. “Syria: Human Rights Situation Remains Dire Amid Efforts for Peace, Says UN Report.” UN News, January 13, 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1158791
[4] X (Twitter Search on “Siyasal Alevi”):
User-generated content on X, accessed January 2025. https://x.com/search?q=siyasal%20alevi&src=typed_query
[5] “Ali Yerlikaya Announces Safe and Voluntary Returns of 52,622 Syrians Within a Month.” Directorate General of Migration Management, January 2025. https://goc.gov.tr/icisleri-bakani-ali-yerlikaya-bir-ayda-52-bin-622-suriyeli-gonullu-guvenli-onurlu-ve-duzenli-geri-donus-yapti