Repercussions of Presidential System: Issue #2
Turkey passed the presidential system with a referendum held on April 16, 2017. This transition meant turning a new page for Turkey, governed by a parliamentary system since its multi-party system was established. This system change achieved its purpose with the elections held in June 2018, and with the victory of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a debate that had poisoned Turkish political life for a long time came to an end. However, the process that brought Turkey to the presidential system and the developments after the transition to the presidential system changed the democratic nature of domestic politics. Moreover, the bureaucratic capacity of the Turkish state has decreased considerably, and values such as institutional autonomy and professionalism have been replaced by partisanship. The presidential system has also affected the political party ecosystem quite dramatically. It changed the alliance tendencies of the political parties and significantly reduced the colorfulness of the parliamentary system. This situation showed itself with the emergence of a structure characterized by polarization and a bipolar system resembling the Cold War era in domestic politics.
This study evaluates the impact of the Turkish presidential system on domestic politics on the axis of three problematic areas. The first will focus on the new system’s impact on democratic processes. Then, the effect of the Presidential System on state institutionalism and bureaucratic capacity will be discussed. Finally, it will be discussed how civil rights and freedoms are affected by this system. This system, which Turkey is not accustomed to, has affected many areas, from media to academia, foreign policy to the economy. When the other parts of the report in which this study will take place are published, a comprehensive examination of the mentioned areas has been made. We aim to get to the roots of other problems and show that the real crisis is political in this study. The area of politics is the starting point of the problems that make themselves felt in many areas of life. Therefore, change should start from here.
Democratic Competition
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, benefiting from the blessings of the parliamentary democratic system, and won a two-thirds majority in the parliament despite 34% of the vote. The 10 percent electoral threshold pushed many parties out of the parliament, and the AKP thus reached the majority to form a government on its own. The society’s reaction to the instability created by fragile coalitions and the economic crises during the nineties produced such an outcome at the ballot box. Right after the election, Erdogan’s ban on politics was lifted with the support of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the only opposition party in the parliament that faced political bans during the February 28 process. Since March 2003, Erdogan has been the head of the executive power.
With the establishment of the AKP, eyes immediately turned to the army. Because although AKP claims to represent the concept of conservative democracy instead of political Islamism, it was founded by politicians from the Welfare Party cadres, which were banned from politics during the February 28 period. Therefore, the sincerity of the democracy, human rights, and pro-European Union rhetoric of AKP was questioned by many. The apparent influence of the army on politics brought with it convictions that the political life of the AKP would not be long.
However, the AKP took a position defending democratic values and fervently supporting EU membership during this period. This way, it succeeded in putting the discussion on the axis of authoritarianism-democracy by removing it from the axis of secularism-Islamism. In particular, the democratizing conditions of the EU accession process were used as an effective instrument to limit the army’s influence on politics. Because the ideals of westernization and reaching the level of contemporary civilization pointed out by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the republic’s founder, prevented the army from objecting to this process in principle. In a sense, the EU membership process was a state policy that transcended parties and institutions. Therefore, the AKP tried to balance the military’s influence on politics by embracing the EU accession process. During this period, the field of civil society in Turkey expanded, and many positive steps were taken in the name of individual rights and freedoms.
However, the reforms and the path taken to solve the economic crisis in the previous government were fully implemented by the AKP. The shadow of the military on politics could only be removed with widespread support and stable economic management. From this point of view, it is possible to say that the AKP did not follow the path of economic populism like the governments of the 90s and continued the reforms made by the previous government until the 2007 elections. The previous government had born these reforms’ bitter consequences and political risks. All the parties that formed the government in the previous term were below the threshold. But the fruits were collected by the AKP government. In other words, when the AKP came to power, it found a stable economy and it kept this stability.
The tendency to see AKP as the only legitimate actor that will democratize the country and create an economy compatible with globalization has emerged both within the country and in the international community. Its performance in the fields of both rights/freedoms and the economy cleared doubts about the AKP’s political Islamist roots. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which opposed the AKP and shaped their discourses around the concepts of secularism and the nation-state, were perceived as extensions of the military-backed national security state in civilian politics and were treated as actors who wanted to maintain the old regime.
It is also possible to say that there is actually a populist strategy behind this whole democratization story, which was met with applause. And over time, this populism has turned into what John Keane called “the new despotism,” an indefinable oppression. In other words, while the Presidency system pointed to a defined and concrete one-man rule, the period that started with the AKP’s rule brought unsystematic authoritarianism that could not be defined but felt and its clues can be found in daily life practices.
The term “white Turk,” which academics and intellectuals who support the AKP often resort to, was used rudely by those who doubted the AKP’s political ambitions and raised strong resistance against it. What was meant by this concept was an elite group that exploited public resources and relied on the state, which was guarded by the military. Contrary to this group, the AKP was positioned as the representative of the real and oppressed people. The story of the corrupt and privileged elite against the oppressed people was a clear indication of ideological populism.
However, another remarkable point was that Erdoğan deviated from the tradition of party leaders meeting in open sessions before the elections. Although it did not attract much attention then, Erdoğan did not prefer to engage in an interlocutor relationship with other political actors. In fact, in order for Erdogan to continue his influence on the right-wing voters, unexpected things have always been fallen the actors who have the potential to challenge him in right-wing politics. For example, in 2007, the Motherland and True Path parties, which came together to rebuild the center-right and were thought to pass the threshold, mysteriously quarreled with each other shortly before the elections, and the coalition they had built broke up. Before the 2011 elections, sex tapes of MPs from the Nationalist Movement Party were broadcast by television channels close to the AKP.
Despite the good economic performance, three remarkable developments were sending the first signal of authoritarianism. The first of these is that the “Public Procurement Law,” which was accepted by the previous government within the scope of structural reforms and should come into force as of 2003, was not implemented by the AKP government. This way, the government could continue to act arbitrarily in public procurement and create economic dependency mechanisms. The current law was changed 192 times in the following years, proving this arbitrariness. On the other hand, the AKP continued the culture of using public banks to gain political advantage. So, in 2007, one of the country’s largest media groups (ATV and Sabah Newspaper) was transferred to the Çalık Group, whose close relations with the AKP are evident, thanks to the loans obtained from public banks. This way, AKP’s control over media institutions began, and over the years, traditional media with few exceptions, came under the control of the government. Finally, in 2004, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) seized the Uzan Media Group, owned by the Genç Party Chairman Cem Uzan and considered one of the country’s most important opposition media organizations. All these signals were ignored to keep the AKP alive, which is thought to be fighting against the military and is believed to bring the country into the European Union. While there was a wave of euphoric democratization on one side, Erdoğan was seizing opportunities to centralize the system on the other.
During this period, the AKP faced two significant challenges: the 2007 Presidential crisis and the party closure case opened in 2008. The Constitutional Court did not accept the closure case. However, it turned the presidential crisis into an opportunity, increasing the vote from 34% in the general elections to 47%. When the popular support received in 2007 combined with the provocations of institutions that could be called “tutelage”, it is seen that the AKP turned to a more aggressive and militant agenda in the post-2007 period, believing that its rivalry was a zero-sum game with the army and judicial bureaucracy. The Ergenekon and Balyoz indictments, which were prepared arbitrarily, only increased the fear of the government in society. These indictments, which paved the way for almost everyone who did not support the AKP to be labeled a putschist, eroded the existing democratic qualifications instead of ensuring the democratic control of the military professionally and institutionally. On the other hand, it has been claimed that the amendments alleged to have been made in the name of judicial independence with the constitutional referendum held on September 12, 2010, will break the tutelage of the judicial bureaucracy. After adopting this change, names close to the AKP (who turned out to be Fetullahist) filled essential seats in the judicial bureaucracy.
The 50% vote support received in 2011 together with the self-confidence of pacifying the army and the judiciary, considered a turning point by many academics. According to them, AKP, which has democratizing energy, started to become authoritarian after this date. However, as mentioned above, AKP’s authoritarianism has deeper roots, and democratization efforts are nothing but an instrument of the AKP’s, or rather Erdogan’s, conjectural needs. Since 2002, Erdogan has established his personal authority in every field where he has the opportunity and has avoided making an institutional arrangement.
Between 2011 and 2015 is actually a period of confusion for the AKP. Because with 2011, Erdogan’s desire for a “Presidential System” came to the fore, and his steps to achieve this goal caused many complications. However, it is possible to argue that the Arab Spring movement changed the foreign policy discourse of the AKP. This change led to the redefinition of identity in domestic politics. While the AKP developed its relations with the Islamist political groups close to governments in the Middle East, it also plunged domestic politics into a whirlpool of animosity, romance, and identity. This definition pointed to an approach that regarded Sunni Islamism as the primary identity and essential element, in which secular and Alevi citizens were excluded.
This stance against Alevi citizens may explain the Gezi Park Protests and the government’s response to these civilian protests with the excessive police force and conspiracy theories. The AKP, which managed to show itself as the champion of democracy for years, failed to give a good test against the first big civil challenge and showed a reaction very similar to the third-world autocracies. Conspiracy theorists on television and rhetoric provoking the society against each other quickly brought the country into a fight within itself. The Western institutions, which until then were seen as the anchor of democratization, turned into foreign forces that wanted to undermine the country’s rise because they supported the Gezi Park protests.
This situation quickly led to adopting the “local and national” discourse, and the country gained a typical populist authoritarian identity against globalization. In this respect, the Turkish regime evokes the regimes led by Orban, Bolsonaro, and Netanyahu. Despite this, it can be said that until the June 7 elections held in 2015, the AKP had at least a discursive respect for the concept of democracy, and the institutions of a competitive political system were still standing. These mechanisms also explain Erdogan’s desire for a presidential system. Evaluation of the current restrictive mechanisms as a hindrance pushed Erdogan to a policy of centralizing the system on his own, along with the presidential system. This period is where the bureaucracy and power balances within the party are still alive. Erdoğan, who was elected as the President in 2014, left the party chairmanship and the prime ministership to Ahmet Davutoğlu, which limited his influence on the party and government policies.
However, the resolution process, which started in January 2013, has placed the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in a legitimate position in the eyes of the people, and this party has become ‘normal’. In other words, the AKP elite’s policy of declaring the HDP illegitimate, which we saw after June 2015, did not exist during this period, and HDP was able to become an influential actor in competitive politics. Of course, the solution process was seen by Erdoğan as a means to carry him to the presidential system. He expected that the HDP would hold elections with independent candidates. Thus the AKP would elect more deputies in the region, where the Kurdish population is concentrated, by taking advantage of the electoral system. In addition, Erdogan had stipulated the support of 400 deputies, which is necessary for a constitutional amendment to allow the presidential system to continue the solution process. However, HDP’s participation in the election as a party and the fact that it received 13% of the vote due to its aggressive and successful campaign caused the AKP to lose its majority in the parliament in the June 7 elections.
June 7, 2015, is a turning point in every respect. Because election results required a coalition, Erdoğan himself sabotaged the coalition government that Davutoğlu was willing to establish with the main opposition party, CHP. Thus, Erdoğan re-strengthened its control within the AKP and destroyed Davutoğlu’s authority and his strategy to act more autonomously than Erdoğan. In this process, Davutoğlu may have thought that a coalition government with the CHP would strengthen him more rather than sharing his power with Erdoğan. This way, the solution process would continue, the transition to the presidential system would be shelved, and Erdoğan would be pushed into a symbolic presidency. However, this did not happen. The coalition talks between the AKP and CHP did not produce any serious results. Erdoğan declared early elections without giving any other party the authority to form a government.
Another development was the end of the solution process and Erdogan’s rapid return to the nationalist discourse. This change in discourse attracted voters who voted for the Nationalist Movement Party, which showed a massive jump to 17% in the June 7, 2015 elections. Hence, the HDP was quickly associated with the PKK and criminalized. In this process, it would not be wrong to say that the PKK narrowed the HDP’s political space by declaring autonomy and starting trench wars in the city centers. Thus, the Kurdish issue evolved into a period of bloody conflict between the security forces and terrorists, in which political actors were trapped.
At the end of this process, HDP, a part of the opposition and played an essential role in the AKP’s falling into a minority, was de facto pushed out of politics. On the other hand, the MHP has successfully distanced itself from the harsh and oppositional rhetoric against the AKP by supporting anti-terrorism policy. Thus, the opposition weakened further against the AKP and regained its parliamentary majority in the elections held on November 1, 2015. This success was credited to Erdoğan, and Davutoğlu’s autonomy within the party was gradually limited. Erdoğan’s anti-terrorism discourse narrowed the political space of the opposition parties. In May 2016, Davutoğlu was forced to resign and was replaced by Binali Yıldırım, who was considered more in line with Erdoğan’s policies. The unsuccessful coup attempt on July 15, 2016, mainly organized by Fetullahist soldiers, unquestionably increased Erdogan’s current authority. With the State of Emergency declared after the coup attempt, judicial review disappeared, and the adjective “fetoism,” which was not defined by an objective criterion, was turned into a useful weapon by the government. The authority to decide on who is a “fetoist” was handed over to the government’s political will. Thus, civil society and politics almost played corners to escape the government’s wrath.
In this period, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s opening of the presidential system for discussion and his party’s statement that he would support a new system constituted one of the turning points in Turkish political history. Bahçeli believed that a presidential system would be more appropriate for the country’s survival, instead of a parliamentary system full of surprises and where HDP can be effective as an actor. In this way, there was a period when Erdoğan needed the support of the MHP to reach 50%, and the government was presented as a guarantee of national interests, the survival of the country, and national security. Thus, it became natural to quickly suppress any formation that opposes the AKP-MHP bloc and does not support their proposed policies. Cases such as the arrest of HDP Co-Chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ and the appointment of trustees to HDP municipalities were presented as a necessity of security policy with the presidential system.
The most interesting development of the state of emergency was that a group within the MHP, which reacted to Bahçeli’s cooperation with Erdoğan, left the party and started a new quest. Meral Akşener, one of the important names of the MHP, forced Bahçeli to the congress and collected the necessary signatures. However, the Bahçeli administration took the matter to the judiciary, and two local courts, in which the government obviously intervened, stopped the congress process. Akşener and his friends were expelled from the party. This cadre united with other names from the center-right tradition and formed the IYI Party.
The formation of IYI Party during the state of emergency was of great importance for the continuation of political competition. The fact that the early election date proposed by Bahçeli in April 2018 was set in a way that would not allow the IYI Party to enter the elections once again revealed the importance of this party in terms of political balances. According to the election law, it was not possible for the IYI Party, founded in October 2017, to participate in the elections on the announced election date. However, this difficulty was overcome when 15 CHP deputies joined the IYI Party, and the party succeeded in forming a group in the parliament. Cooperation between the opposition parties yielded positive results for the country’s democracy. Thus, the IYI Party, which received 10% of the votes in the elections, entered the parliament and the CHP-IYI Party’s cooperation formed the main backbone of the opposition.
Although the results of the 2018 Presidential elections gave Erdoğan the presidency with the system he had desired for years, authoritarianism similar to the desired Russian system could not be fully established. It was important for the continuity of political competition that the opposition reached 48% of the votes and that the AKP could reach the parliamentary majority only with the support of the MHP. However, these developments did not change the fact that HDP was criminalized and isolated from the opposition bloc. Although it continued its life as a political party, both the politicians’ discourse and the pro-government media editorial policy continued to see HDP as an extension of the terrorist organization PKK.
The most crucial development in this period was the opposition’s victory of the Istanbul-Ankara and Izmir municipalities in the 2019 local elections. These electoral victories for the opposition, which fell into despair after the 2018 elections, gave morale to the opposition voters. The voters witnessed a concrete development that the government might change for the first time in years. However, trustees were appointed to all provincial municipalities won by the HDP shortly after the elections. The municipalities were handed over to bureaucrats and politicians close to the AKP.
The impact of the Covid-19 epidemic and the economic problems that started in the world was much stronger with Erdogan’s policy of lowering interest rates. Therefore, after the elections, problems such as high inflation, unstable dollar exchange rate, and deep poverty reduced the government’s popularity. This situation caused names such as Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, excluded from the AKP and came to the fore with their more moderate and pragmatic views, to break away from the party and establish new parties. In addition, the anti-immigrant far-right Victory Party, founded by Ümit Özdağ, who broke away from the IYI Party, and the Memleket Party, which was founded by Muharrem İnce, who left the CHP, and proposed a Kemalist program, were also added to the opposition options.
It would not be wrong to say that after 2019, a political picture with more voices and more alternatives emerged in all respects. The pressure during the state of emergency was relaxed, and the political competition started to progress in a relatively more balanced way. However, the pressure on the HDP and the so-called illegitimacy of this party by the government continued. HDP’s former co-chairman, Selahattin Demirtaş, is still in detention. A party closure case has been filed against HDP, and the decision of the Constitutional Court is awaited. The efforts of the AKP and MHP elite to label the entire opposition as “traitor” and “terrorist” and their tendency to identify themselves with national security continue. However, these discourses are overshadowed by the economic crisis and corruption scandals that erupt almost daily.
Moreover, AKP, which did not accept the results of the March 31, 2019, Istanbul local elections and forced the YSK to declare re-election, received a letter from PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan advising the Kurds not to vote for the CHP candidate before the second election to be held and shared it with the public. This letter showed that when the AKP’s political power was in danger, it could even get support from Öcalan and cast a shadow on the nationalism show that had been going on for years. But the AKP’s decline in its ability to curb political competition does not mean it has given up. Because, before the 2023 elections, AKP is doing its best to increase the conflicts and tensions between the opposition parties.
State Institutionalism and Bureaucratic Capacity
Administrative centralization reached its peak with the presidential system. The President does not have his cabinet ratified by parliament, and cabinet members do not have to be deputies. Therefore, ministers are accountable to the President who appoints them, not to the parliament. In the new system, the weight of the parliament has decreased so much that the President has the right to withdraw from the international conventions accepted by the parliamentary decision with a single decree. A practical example of this has been seen in the example of the Istanbul Convention. 6 out of 13 Council of Judges and Prosecutors members, which are thought to ensure the independence of the judiciary, are directly appointed by the President. The parliament elects the remaining members. Considering the weights of AKP and MHP, it can be said that the institution mentioned above is entirely under the control of the government. In March 2021, 4 of the remaining seven members were proposed by the People’s (Cumhur) Alliance and three by the Nation Alliance. In other words, ten members of the HSK were indirectly and directly appointed by Tayyip Erdoğan. Thus, the influence of the government on the judiciary became undisputed. As can be seen, it has become quite easy for an AKP member president to violate the independence of the judiciary. For this system to produce an independent judiciary, the elected President must not influence any party in the parliament, and the political parties in the parliament must act in complete consensus. In cases where such a situation does not occur, the person who wins the presidential election can quickly take control of the judiciary.
The presidential system allowed the President to be a political party member. This is one of the most important reasons for bureaucratic erosion in Turkey. In other words, the appointments are made not only by the President but also by the AKP leader. Appointed bureaucrats, rectors, and diplomats are not only responsible to the President but also the AKP leader. This situation is confusing and has started the partisanship among bureaucrats. Thus, bureaucrats, limited by law and expected to act impersonally and for the benefit of the whole nation, have turned into commissars of a party within the bureaucratic mechanism. After the presidential system was put into practice, it was seen that bureaucrats who were expected to be autonomous, such as the President of the Central Bank, the President of the Statistical Institute, the General Director of the Turkish Radio and Television Institution, and the university rectors, vehemently implemented Erdoğan’s arbitrary decisions despite the laws.
This trend had two consequences. First, the institutional capacity of the mentioned institutions has weakened, and the authoritarian practices have yielded negative results. The performance of universities has decreased, and all of them, without exception, have leveled down in the world rankings. The Central Bank, by applying the interest-inflation theory developed by Eroğan, caused a currency crisis, and then high inflation brought about the impoverishment of the people. The statistics of the Statistical Institute are no longer credible to the public, and the institution has lost its credibility. RTÜK, on the other hand, has come to the fore with the arbitrary punishments it has given to opposition press organizations, has lost its qualification as a regulatory institution, and acts as the press commissioner seen in similar authoritarian governments. At the end of the day, the abolition of bureaucratic autonomy has opened the door to the decline of institutional capacity and the management of institutions by partisans instead of experts.
Second, the principles of the state, citizenship, and the rule of law have been destroyed. Citizens are expected to be equal before the law in a modern nation-state, and bureaucrats are impersonal and legally responsible. If the state treasury is financed by the taxes of all citizens, bureaucrats who receive their salaries from the treasury are also responsible before the citizens. The laws determine the limits and procedures of this responsibility. With the presidential system, this line has been distorted, and a distinction has emerged between AKP voters, who are acceptable citizens, and those who do not vote for AKP, which are undesirable citizens. Bureaucrats have seen no harm in violating the legal framework that protects all citizens. They do this to show their loyalty to the President AKP voters voted for. Thus, the state apparatus was actually integrated with the party, and the party-state emerged. The structure in which political motivations stretch laws, and Frankel calls the “dual state,” has been born out. In other words, a separate law has emerged as a law for ordinary citizens and a law for AKP elites. This has damaged both the state’s unity and the citizens’ equality.
Civil Rights and Freedoms
With the presidential system, we have seen that civil rights and freedoms are restricted at an alarming level. There were also civil rights and freedoms violations before the AKP in Turkey. However, we think there is a point to be noted here. Many intellectuals claim that AKP has reverted to the old habits of Turkey in recent years, and the “deep state” structure has taken over the AKP. We are not of this opinion. Because we do not think that Erdogan’s agency has been restricted by the Presidential System; on the contrary, he has come to the fore more as an actor. Thus, we argue that there is a character difference between pre-AKP authoritarianism and AKP authoritarianism. This difference begins with acknowledging that the old system, by its nature based on national security, restricted the field of civil rights and freedoms.
On the other hand, during the AKP era, the system has no other purpose than to keep Erdoğan in power. Its nature is built on it. Therefore, it points to a structure that flexes and transforms according to the conditions, selectively violating some rights and releasing others, rather than totally hitting civil rights and freedoms. In other words, the AKP government has not developed an objective and defined perspective of rights and freedoms from the very beginning and has opened up space for those who need support according to their political needs. The areas of freedom, which were recognized by Erdogan’s personal will and grace, were again destroyed by his intervention.
The presidential system protected the discourse and priorities of the coalition formed by Erdoğan after June 7 and criminalized alternative or critical approaches to them. Erdogan and the coalition he founded explain every action and policy with the axis of national security and prevent public discussion. The most obvious example of this situation took place in November of 2021. While the country was experiencing an unprecedented currency crisis and the Turkish Lira was losing value rapidly, the National Security Council took the obviously unsuccessful economic policy to the agenda. It evaluated the cheapening of the Turkish Lira as an export-oriented economic approach. The continuation of this policy is considered essential for national security. This example points to an atmosphere where de facto freedom of expression can be constantly restricted on national security grounds.
From this point of view, it is necessary to understand how difficult it is to go beyond the government’s discourse in areas such as foreign and security policies. Because the components of the People’s (Cumhur) Alliance have a roadmap that prioritizes military approaches, especially in the field of foreign policy, in other words, they do not prefer such issues to be the subject of political discussions. In their minds, some options are already known to be correct and need not be discussed, and what is required is to show political will to achieve the goal by military means. Therefore, discussing any foreign policy step, suggesting different strategies, and criticizing the implemented policy becomes no different than collaborating with the enemy on the way to the goal. Therefore, having a military presence in regions such as Syria, Libya and Afghanistan is a non-partisan policy. Objecting to these policies quickly leads to labeling as non-national.
This understanding has turned foreign policy issues into an area that makes it impossible to discuss. Issues such as Turkey’s Syria policy, the purchase of the S-400 defense systems, its involvement in the Civil War in Libya, and the control of the Afghanistan International Airport were not reflected in the public debate. However, they were discussed within the framework of patriotic nationalism. Society finds it risky to express an opinion on such matters. At such critical moments, opposition politicians are expected to react against and draw the government’s wrath. The silence of the opposition and its support of the ongoing government policy with the argument of “supra-political” prevents people from expressing their views and makes this action risky.
In addition to national security, concepts such as “public security,” “insulting religious values,” and “general morality of society” were frequently used discourses during the Presidential System, and the scope of civil liberties was restricted by resorting to these discourses. Many prosecutors and bureaucrats, especially referring to Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code, punish artists, comedians, and social media users in some way or ban events such as youth festivals and concerts based on this article. In August 2022, the words of singer Gülşen for the graduates of Imam Hatip High School caused her to be arrested first and then sentenced to house arrest. In the summer of 2022, a total of 14 festivals were canceled upon the complaint of Islamic foundations by order of the local administrators in the festival area. Among the reasons for the ban, issues such as alcohol sales, forest fires, and environmental safety were shown. These bans were seen as direct interference with the lifestyle and were perceived as a conscious strategy pursued by the AKP to attract radical segments.
After the 2018 elections ended the state of emergency, the local elections were first made, and then the Covid-19 pandemic broke out. With the end of the pandemic, a significant economic crisis emerged. Therefore, it was not possible to implement the methods of mass hysteria and collective punishment experienced after July 15. Instead, the government focused on specific people and issues with social relevance. Withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention by the presidential decree, punishing famous personalities with the accusation of insulting religious values, accepting a particular lifestyle as a norm, and treating those who comply with this norm as “primary elements” are the types of intervention in civilian life of the Presidential System period.
The pressure exerted by the government on the media, academia, and civil society is based on occupying the area defined as a cultural power, and if it is unable to do so, preventing it from being occupied by the opposition. Strategies such as systematic discrediting, social media lynchings, and troll attacks have also become very dangerous for people to exist in the public sphere with their own identities and thoughts.
Conclusion
The Presidential System has failed to deliver the prosperity and security that Erdogan promised. This is a fact. Society was rapidly impoverished, and due to a conscious policy, only certain segments could get a share of the welfare. Society is divided within itself, polarization has increased, and it is not possible to create a civilized public discussion environment. The institution of politics has ceased to be a mechanism that represents and solves society’s problems. Even AKP deputies are not effective in decision-making processes. An advisor appointed by Erdogan, a journalist who managed to get on Erdogan’s plane, or a social media troll who can somehow contact Erdogan’s close circle can be more involved in the decision-making processes. The character of the presidential system that kills politics, and public debate has inevitably increased economic and social problems.
Moreover, the violation of the independence of the judiciary, the fact that political loyalty matters and the vulgar use of national security discourses have increased the number of partisans and corrupt people who do not have any expertise. Turkey wakes up almost every morning to the news of corruption. The AKP’s embrace of the culture war, which is the area it knows best to cover all these negativities, and the strategy of dividing the society according to lifestyle and provoking social groups against each other seriously threaten civil liberties.
Given the divided nature of the opposition, Turkey should immediately abandon the Presidential System. Otherwise, even if the opposition wins the 2023 elections, segments of society that can organize quickly and do not have a categorical problem with authoritarianism may make a more radical comeback. This structural change is essential for the safe progress of the political competition, for social reconciliation and peace to be ensured, and for individuals to exist freely.
*This article was published in collaboration with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.
Photo: Marija Zaric