David Ben-Gurion, the former Prime Minister of Israel, stated in 1955 about the significance of water resources: “Today, Israel is fighting with the Arabs over water resources, and the outcome of this war is directly tied to the destiny of Israel. If we fail in this battle, we will have no place in the land of Palestine.”
Arthur Ruppin, one of Israel’s prominent theorists, also emphasized that peace from the perspective of Israel in the region will only be achieved when it is accompanied by the seizure and control of Arab water resources. Therefore, water is a fundamental factor for the security and survival of Israel.
Water is a strategic objective for the Israeli state, and the issue of water for this regime goes beyond mere development concerns; it is a matter linked to the existence of the country and is one of the fundamental pillars of continuing Israel’s plan in the region. I don’t want to start the story with the establishment of Israel; I believe the first few sentences here summarize the tale of water, energy, land, and ideology in Israel. Let me take you to the initial turning point: the year 1967, a year when water and blood learned to coexist and, at times, even tasted the scent of gunpowder.
Rivers of Conflict: How Water Fuels Regional Tensions
Israel and Egypt signed an agreement in 1979 to illustrate the importance of water on a regional level. Following this agreement, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat stated, “Egypt will never go to war again except to defend its water resources.” This is a clear example where Anwar Sadat once again highlighted the importance of water for his country, stating that they would only go to war if their water resources were threatened.
Water has long been a key to war and peace in the region and will continue to be. The United Nations, in its 2003 report titled “Water for the Future 2003” predicted that by 2040, wars over water will occur in the Middle East. In wars that have occurred so far, the points targeted, fought over, and considered the most critical have been water resources. During both World Wars, all sides sought to control hydroelectric plants and water resources.
An example along these lines is the use of the waterways feeding into the Jordan River. The issue of water in the Jordan/Syria basin—specifically how it should be shared among Jordan, Israel, Syria, and Palestine—is one of the region’s most pressing challenges. Experts who closely monitor all four countries assert that in our era, one of the primary sources of tension among these nations is the Jordan River, also known as Al-Urdun. This river flows through the territories of all four states before ultimately reaching the Dead Sea.
Regarding the shared use of international waters, no comprehensive regulations exist, and the limited frameworks currently in place have not been fully transformed into binding legal norms. This has compelled the four countries to seek agreements, which have occasionally escalated into conflicts. Historically, agreements regarding the use of transboundary waters were established among nations, but particularly after the 19th century, numerous agreements on water usage have either been disregarded or rapidly replaced by wars. Over time, the parties involved have sought to strengthen their positions by developing the concepts of “shared water,” “international water,” and “boundary-forming water.”
Globally, it is widely accepted that water originating and ending within the boundaries of a single country falls under that nation’s sovereignty, granting it full rights to utilize the resource as it sees fit. However, countries have established numerous treaties and agreements when it comes to transboundary waters that cross national borders. In regions where water scarcity is a pressing issue, disputes over water-sharing often turn into serious conflicts, with some escalating into outright wars.
One of the major disputes between Israel and Syria revolves around the use of the Jordan River. In the 1950s, when Israel attempted to establish its National Water Carrier project, Syria intervened militarily. A decade later, when Syria tried to redirect the upper tributaries of the Jordan River toward its own territory, Israel responded by bombing Syria’s constructed channels, halting the development of the project.
Globally, there are numerous examples of conflicts and wars over water. Each time, instead of focusing on proper utilization and fair distribution, states prioritize their own interests, creating obstacles and challenges to the equitable sharing of this critical resource. In 1959, preliminary efforts began to address the issue, but over the years, significant progress remained elusive. In 1970, the United Nations once again brought this matter to the forefront and tasked the International Law Commission with drafting a framework titled “The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.” After extensive work and deliberation, the Commission’s report was presented on April 24, 1997, and subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly. According to this framework, waters that cross or form borders were defined as “international watercourses.” The accepted text emphasized the principles of equitable and reasonable use. However, due to the refusal of 35 countries, including Turkey, to sign the final treaty, the agreement was never implemented.
Israel and the Nile: A Century-Long Interest
Interestingly, a similar project was proposed in early 1974 by Israeli water specialist Elisha Kally, envisioning the transfer of Nile waters as a solution to meet Israel’s water needs. The Israeli regime’s interest in the Nile is deeply rooted, dating back to 1903 when Theodor Herzl proposed to the British the settlement of European Jews in the Sinai Desert and the diversion of Nile waters to the region. Furthermore, in the late 1950s, Golda Meir stated that just 1% of the Nile’s annual flow—around 800 million cubic meters—could resolve Israel’s water issues.
However, opposition to such ventures was fierce. In 1981, Egyptian journalist Sobhi Kahlan wrote: “The Nile is an international watercourse, and Egypt cannot unilaterally divert its waters to a specific route without the consent of its partners—Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire.” He noted that most of these nations expressed dissatisfaction with the proposal, considering it a violation of international law. He also argued that the greatest obstacle would be the Egyptian people, who regard the Nile as a sacred source of life and prosperity. Kahlan warned that public outrage would erupt if Egyptians believed that their sacred Nile waters were being diverted to their enemies.
On the other hand, Israelis referred to this proposal as “the plan of the year” and had already prepared cost estimates and technical details while evaluating its political implications years before Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel. It was, in fact, Sadat who disclosed Israel’s plans. On December 17, 1979, he officially initiated the construction of the “Peace Canal,” which was intended to transport Nile water from under the Suez Canal to Sinai and eventually to the Negev Desert in southern occupied territories. Around the same time, on January 16, 1979, an article titled “The New Zamzam Project” was published in Cairo, informing the Egyptian public that Nile water would be directed to Tel Aviv. Shortly thereafter, Sadat referenced the project in a letter to King Hassan II of Morocco. He wrote: “I have reached maximum agreement with the Israeli Prime Minister… as an incentive to resolve the crisis of Al-Aqsa Mosque, I proposed setting aside a portion of Egypt’s share of the Nile for Israel.”
However, Menachem Begin later sent a letter clarifying that if receiving Nile water was perceived as “a concession” to Tel Aviv, he had no interest in pursuing the matter further. Reacting forcefully to anything that limits or removes Egypt’s access to the Nile’s waters has been one of Egypt’s basic ideas of national security as well as a major component of its strategic doctrine. On the other hand, the signing of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2015 appears to have erased this sensitivity. Ethiopia was able to build the dam thanks to this deal, which is judged disastrous for Egypt’s water security. Based on David Ben-Gurion’s security policy, which he developed as the concept of “The Periphery Alliance”, Israel’s engagement in Africa and other areas surrounding the Arab world is rooted. Establishing close ties with Arab neighbors and thereby reducing Israel’s diplomatic isolation helps this approach to envelop Egypt’s national security as well as those of other Arab nations.
Ethiopia started building the GERD on the Nile, and the dam was erected as though it were being built in a nation in the Nile’s basin rather than at its source or along its path. This shows that, instead of Ethiopia’s claims of development purposes, the constructing aims of the dam are political in character. Ethiopia is emerging as a political force in Africa, endangering the national security of Egypt. Israel, long trying to seize control of Egypt and manage its water resources, has given Ethiopia significant help. Israeli activities caused Jordan to periodically run out of water in 2023. Jordan promised to receive 25 to 50 million cubic meters of water annually from Israel under the terms of the 1994 peace treaty between the two countries. Israel has broken this agreement, nevertheless, on several occasions, severely compromising Jordan. For Israel and Jordan, water is today a cause of geopolitical conflict. Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s foreign minister, said he cannot talk water and energy with an Israeli minister while Israel keeps bombing Gaza.
Israel’s initiatives to protect its water source have made life difficult not only in Jordan but also in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Israel violated the 1994 Jordan River Water Division Agreement by reducing Jordan’s fair share by half, resulting in public abuse of Jordanian and Syrian water supplies. Palestinians are thus severely deprived of water since the Palestinian Authority only gets a meager portion of the mountain aquifer of the West Bank. Moreover, Israel’s takeover of the Golan Heights has deprived Syria of Lake Tiberius water. In this regard, Israel has looked for technological developments to bolster water security. It has made large investments in desalination projects, building five large desalination plants in Sorek and Ashdod to guarantee an ideal water supply for itself and complicate life for the people living in Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon.
Water Crises in Gaza and Lebanon: A Humanitarian Challenge
According to Lebanese officials, severe water shortages have plagued many of southern Lebanon’s border towns and villages in past years. The Israeli force has destroyed much of the infrastructure and facilities for water purification and supply, leading to severe water shortages. Israeli strikes damaged the Wazzani Spring Pumping Station, the biggest water pumping station in southern Lebanon, in autumn 2023. Since 2002, one of the main sources of conflict between Lebanon and Israel has been their respective rights to pump water from the Hasbani River.
Local Lebanese official Ahmad Al-Muhammad said that Israel’s attacks on pumps, water distribution networks, and electrical systems have harmed the project and stopped water pumping to many border towns and villages. The government has also stopped technical workers from fixing the infrastructure, therefore hindering efforts at rehabilitation by bombing the highways leading to them. Former head of the Jabal Amel Federation of Municipalities Ali Al-Zein observed that the Wazzani water project pumped roughly 12,000 cubic meters of water every day, feeding 70 cities and villages. However, as the destruction of this infrastructure continues, a serious drinking water issue has emerged along the border.
Furthermore, the hazardous military situations in the area hinder southern citizens from reaching rivers and springs. Israeli air and artillery assaults near Lebanon’s border have resulted in a drinking water scarcity, requiring people to gather rainwater and channel it through plastic pipes from rooftops, satisfying their restricted and challenging demands. In some places, Lebanese residents have turned to well digging, therefore compromising their hygiene and health. The Ministry of Interior of Lebanon claims that 133,600 people live in the southern Lebanon border area among 83 cities and villages. At least half of this population nowadays finds it difficult to find drinkable water.
Underlying Gaza and the West Bank, Israel mostly depends on two main aquifers: the mountain aquifer and the coastal aquifer. Israel’s surface water supplies are mostly found in the north and east; its use of Jordan River resources presents problems for Jordan and Syria. Israel has essentially expanded its internal water supplies and lowered the risk of world conflicts over water without physically stretching its boundaries. Comprising canals, pipelines, and pumping stations, Tel Aviv also created the National Water Carrier Project to move water from the Sea of Galilee in the water-rich north to the central and southern areas.
Since 1967, Israelis have occupied the Golan Heights, which are in southwest Syria. The Golan Heights, an important ridge that lies between Israel and Syria and above southern Lebanon, is just 70 kilometers from Damascus. Israel has shortened this distance to 25 kilometers after advancing into Syrian territory following the Assad era, even grabbing control of the Al-Wahda Dam, which provides 30% of Syria and Jordan’s water supplies. Strategically important, the Golan Heights lie 1,000 to 1,200 meters above sea level. Israel’s occupation continues even though UN Resolution 242 calls for her departure from the Golan. Israel’s interest in the Golan Heights stems mostly from its many surface and groundwater resources, which are essential for the neighboring regions. Israel has been driven to keep occupying this area by important water sources like Masada Lake in Quneitra, the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) between the Golan and Palestine, and rivers such as the Jordan to the west and Raqqad to the north. Gaza, meanwhile, is in severe water shortage. The Gaza Strip has battled a serious drinking water scarcity for two decades.
Gaza’s Water Crisis and Israel’s Strategic Dilemmas
The coastal aquifer accounts for over ninety percent of Gaza’s well water. However, overuse of this aquifer, particularly along the shore, has lowered water levels and increased Mediterranean seawater intrusion—especially since the early 2000s. Three desalination plants mostly provide drinking water for Gaza; Israel closed them down on October 7, restarting only part of the facilities in December 2023 amid enormous pressure from the Biden administration. Although Gaza boasts 284 groundwater wells, the water they generate is typically contaminated, frequently problematic with dangerously high saline levels. Two of the desalination plants are essentially nonfunctional, according to research by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), while the third, a small plant built by the United Arab Emirates on the Egyptian side of Rafah, runs at maximum capacity daily, producing 2,400 cubic meters of water after building a 3-kilometer transmission line. Many pipelines originally carrying purified water have stopped working because of insufficient fuel to run pumps; intense Israeli shelling has destroyed others. OCHA notes further that as of February, two of the three pipes providing water from Israel’s Mekorot Water Company were not in operation. Mekorot delivers 12% of Gaza’s water and manages all water supplies on the West Bank. Though it is still in use, the third pipeline—the Bani Saeed line—now generates just 6,000 cubic meters of water daily—only 42% of its capacity.
Israeli desalination firms have meanwhile been monopolizing desalination technology in the area by securing exclusive contracts with Gulf nations and other Arab states. Israel has strengthened its political and economic relations with Arab countries amid the water scarcity and crisis in Gaza and the West Bank and their spillover into Jordan and Syria. This happens when Israel’s activities greatly aggravate water shortages in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Therefore, these countries geopolitically and hydrologically depend on Tel Aviv for answers.
Israel’s National Water Carrier system has also brought environmental problems. The 1948 decision to build the system aimed to direct water from the Sea of Galilee. The system’s implementation, which required rerouting the Jordan, Yarmouk, and Litany Rivers from north to south, was completed in 1964. 61 years after it was finished, today the project has caused significant collateral damage: a dramatic drop in the water level of the Sea of Galilee, conflicts between Syria and Jordan over water, and maybe most importantly, severe damage to the Dead Sea from the sharp drop in water inflow from the Jordan River. Not yet able to settle these conflicts are Lebanon, Jordan, modern Syria, and most definitely not Palestine, which lacks a sovereign state.
All in all, Israel’s future depends ultimately on availability of drinkable water. The nation mostly depends on desalination plants, groundwater aquifers, and water supplies from Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Apart from political difficulties, pollution from natural gas and oil development near the coast could endanger desalination plants and water supplies. Supported by Trump-era policies, U.S. oil and gas companies could compel Israel to let them access these resources. Under such conditions, Israel would soon have to make a crucial decision between giving drinking water first priority or energy resources first importance. Or perhaps it would be better to say: dominance over both, beyond blood and oil!