Turkey has a long list of legislation and regulations in place that pose a threat to media freedom, the right to access information, and free expression in the country. The legislative processes in this regard follow a pattern in the last two decades under the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). One of the topics of discussion over the last two years, the “foreign influence agents law” draft bill, is not diverging from this pattern either.
The proposal in Turkey was criticised heavily last year by international and local civil society organisations for its potential to easily be used for intimidating civil society and independent media, as it could open the door for prosecutors to launch investigations against anyone that they deem as inconvenient to the government’s policies, to supposedly counter foreign influence. Once a person gets labelled as a foreign agent, the stigma alone would be enough for them to lose their credibility -at least partially- in the public eye, even if there may be no proof or evidence of any kind of wrongdoing.
Before passing a law in Turkey, government officials often start using the labels of the next draft law they will be working on to create the “demand” for the law in the eyes of the public. This was the case with the Disinformation Law, as many journalists were accused of practicing disinformation for years, as the government officials continuously stated that there was a need for such a law. Similarly, for the past decade, government officials also referred to journalists and reports from civil society organisations (CSOs) as “serving the interests of foreign powers”. When a journalist or CSO publishes a work exposing scandals, the people involved would be hastily labelled as “foreign influence agents”, gradually leading to the argument that legislation would be necessary to penalise these kinds of publications. One of the latest examples of this labelling was the case of exiled journalist Metin Cihan and his investigations revealing arms exports to Israel through Turkey’s ports despite the government’s claims of not doing so. The word “agent” in Turkish, which is synonymously used as the word for “spy,” brings another layer to this draft bill.
The draft bill that has been brought up in the parliament multiple times throughout 2024 and then withdrawn in November, claims to promote transparency about foreign funding, and government officials refer to other countries’ transparency regulations. However, in practice, this would become yet another tool in criminalising critical voices by equating them with espionage.
During the annual media freedom mission of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), which took place in November 2024 last year, the draft law was to be brought to the general assembly, when at the last minute it was withdrawn with a promise to reintroduce and pass it in 2025. The draft law suggested amendments to the Penal Code to introduce vague provisions such as “acting in coherence with foreign interests” as well as “acting against the political ambitions of the government”. Such vague statements would pave the way for journalists, activists, or anyone else who has any kind of connection to an organisation that regularly deals with international counterparts and engages in any kind of critical statement about the many scandalous developments in Turkey, to be labelled as “agents” or, in the Turkish case, as “spies”. This could be happening regardless of financial ties to any international organisation.
What is the situation in other countries, though?
This is not unique for Turkey. Across Europe and in its neighbourhood, there are multiple legislations that were introduced under the banner of transparency, but in practice, they very often serve to stigmatise and silence. Media Freedom Rapid Response’s Media Freedom Monitoring Report focuses on this topic as a thematic topic in a dedicated chapter in its latest six-month report covering the first half of 2025. According to the report, in the first half of the year, there were reported 45 media freedom violations linked to foreign-agent narratives, more than half being perpetrated by government officials. Independent media outlets and journalists were labelled as “funded media” with the accusation of operating in the interest of foreign powers to undermine local government efforts. Through these narratives, journalists were discredited, their physical safety was threatened, and they were subjected to harassment in the aftermath of this labelling.
For instance, in Georgia, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence obliges the media outlets to register as serving foreign powers if they receive funding from abroad, which many media outlets have been avoiding. Hungary has a Sovereignty Law that empowers state offices to blocklist outlets that receive funding from outside of the country. In Slovakia, despite removing the wording that refers to “foreign agency” or “lobbying” due to public reactions, a law was passed this year and is prone to arbitrary enforcement in the coming periods. The supposed rhetoric of openness in these examples also covers the political control ambitions that these laws enable. The draft law that has been waiting on the shelf in Turkey also follows a similar trend that we can observe in a wider region: transparency presented as a pretext while intimidation is the ultimate practice.
The fundamental difference between the similarly titled “foreign agent laws” in various other countries and the draft bill in Turkey is that, while the others are also highly problematic, they are primarily built around the administrative disclosure obligations, while the one in Turkey is structured to penalise people for their critical work or views, penalising rights monitoring and advocacy efforts.
For instance, the notorious law in Georgia that has impacted the country drastically over the past year required CSOs and media outlets to register if they received more than 20% of their funding from outside of the country. Even though the CSOs strongly resisted the draft law before passing the parliamentary stage, the framework remained administrative. Following the passing of the original law, Georgian authorities started bringing up a new requirement for CSOs to get clearance from the government before they receive funding from abroad, with a translation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act in the US. This created a cascading process of the administrative disclosure to government control of the funds, even though, for the moment being without direct charges of espionage.
In all democratic countries, there are some forms of transparency mechanisms for CSOs, where organisations file paperwork and disclose sources, and go through audit processes. In Turkey, the proposed mechanism concerning the Foreign Influence Agent Law leans on a presumption of criminal activities and not only focuses on the organisation, but also focuses on individuals who are not affiliated with any organisation. In the case that someone would fail to meet the vaguely defined criteria of “acting in accordance with the political interests of the government”, this would mean that the person not only loses license to operate or pay a monetary fine but also gets criminally prosecuted as a spy of a foreign country, being declared as an “enemy”. This would have nothing to do with transparency, but instead it is a trap being set for anyone who may make a critical statement concerning the developments in the country, in case the government deems this statement as “unwelcome”.
Why yet another law to target free expression?
Turkey’s media landscape is already surrounded by draconian laws and regulations. Media regulator RTÜK is closely monitoring any appearance on screens for a critical comment to issue heavy monetary penalties and broadcast ban orders, checking online platforms to cancel licenses. Online censorship is rampant, while the Constitutional Court rulings on access bans are being overruled by lower courts. In the middle of all this legislative siege, why should the government introduce yet another law to target free expression and critical speech?
One obvious element is the chilling effect… Each time there is a new draft law being discussed, long before it comes into force or even the parliamentary debate stage, many people join the silent majority in shying away from raising their voices to criticise any kind of wrongdoing. However, this time the draft law also creates a circle beyond that reluctance to speak up, but to the overall civil society landscape, sending waves creating fear around the applications towards much-needed international human rights funds.
CSOs in Turkey already fill out extensive forms citing all the risks they are facing when applying for funding. Now they will need to add another line as a risk: “We might be labelled as traitors if we receive this fund,” on top of the many warnings already listed in those forms.
The authorities refer to this law as a transparency requirement, providing examples of similar legislation around the world, but the law goes beyond that.. As the governing authorities do not engage in transparency processes themselves, and even the legislative processes take place behind closed doors in the darkness, it appears highly inconsistent.
Considering the vague wording of the legislation in Turkey, if the opposition parties were to engage with the governing alliance in re-drafting this bill and introduce a clear set of requirements to base any investigation to be opened under this law, I would then remind the implementation of the Disinformation Law. The Disinformation Law requires multiple steps for one to be eligible for investigation under this law, but dozens of journalists were subjected to investigations under this legislation, as prosecutors bypassed the requirements, and eventually, there were convictions.
What can be done?
The most obvious solution to the problems around transparency and legality of media practices would be to establish clear rules on administering these entities to clarify financial reporting, tax compliance, and auditing. This would also be in line with the mechanisms that already exist in many democratically governed countries, and supposedly already exist in Turkey, at least in legislation. If CSOs or media outlets are to disclose their sources of funding, this should be done in a way that does not already stigmatise them as “criminals”. Otherwise, there is an apparent risk of this process turning the notion of “transparency” into a pretext for branding any critical voice as “spies for foreign entities”.
Law no. 5253 in Turkey already regulates the structure, administration, and auditing rules for CSOs, and additionally, in 2020, Turkey adopted Law no 7262, “the Law on Preventing Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” which gives overarching powers to extensively create bureaucratic pressure on CSOs that also deepens the auditing practices. However, similar provisions do not apply to the media sector, where the majority of actors are pro-government business owners. It is important to note that a genuine and transparent law would be beneficial for the media sector. For instance, the confiscation of media outlets by state bodies in recent years, which is yet again exemplified by the confiscation of Haberturk, Show TV, and Bloomberg HT after the TV networks’ transfer to Can Holding last year, despite the ongoing investigations into financial irregularities in this holding. Had there been a true transparency framework, such a conglomerate would not be eligible to operate in this field. Yet, it is once again important to underline that the draft proposal that is currently on the shelf is far from addressing such domestic transactions. The draft law’s purpose is far from transparent, as it appears to be based on intimidation.
To summarise, Turkey’s proposed foreign influence agent law is not about transparency but about suspicion and stigmatisation. It is based on the construction of a legal basis for labelling government critics as spies. When compared to the other countries’ similar laws, the Turkish version focuses on criminalisation and intimidation rather than administrative disclosure. Having said that, multiple other countries seem to be also following in the example of the draft law in Turkey. Yet, the draft law in Turkey cannot be considered as a transparency measure but as an instrument to shrink the media landscape and civil society arena even further. Transparency cannot be based on labelling; yet in Turkey, the word is being twisted into a weapon.