As Iraq heads toward its 2025 elections, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF-Haşdi Şabi) has emerged as a defining issue-one that could reshape Iraq’s political landscape and destabilize the broader region. Behind the scenes, competing domestic factions, U.S. and Iranian power plays, and the looming threat of sectarian fragmentation have turned the PMF from a national defense force into a geopolitical fault line. This article examines the current crisis surrounding the PMF, internal rivalries among Shiite blocs, and the broader implications for Iraq’s sovereignty and regional stability. If left unresolved, these tensions may not only ignite internal conflict in Iraq but also spill over into neighboring Iran, where similar ethnic, sectarian, and geopolitical fault lines remain dangerously exposed.
Al-Mada newspaper has claimed that several Shiite politicians promised former U.S. President Donald Trump that they would dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) if they assumed power in Iraq’s next government. Meanwhile, reports indicate growing U.S. pressure on Baghdad to resolve the PMF issue once and for all – a pressure unfolding amid mounting internal and regional tensions.
These developments come as the draft law regarding the PMF has been postponed to the next legislative term due to political disagreements. In this context, Eram News, citing an Iraqi parliamentary source, reported that “Western concerns – particularly from the United States – have delayed the passage of the bill.” The source noted fears that the law could legitimize non-state armed groups, complicating Iraq’s relations with Western countries.
At the same time, the occupation of a Ministry of Agriculture building in Baghdad’s Saydiya district – near the Alwa al-Rashid area – by units from Saraya al-Difa’ al-Shaabi and the PMF’s 45th and 46th Brigades sparked significant controversy in Iraq’s already tense political environment. The catalyst: the dismissal of the director of the Agricultural Department in the Karkh district – an otherwise routine administrative change that escalated into a full-blown armed confrontation. The dismissed director, refusing to vacate his position, was backed by PMF factions and Kataib Hezbollah, which deployed light and medium weapons to storm the building. This resulted in violent clashes with the federal police, emergency forces, and building security guards, leaving multiple dead and wounded – yet another alarming example of how uncontrolled weapons have eroded the authority of the state and endangered its citizens.
According to Iraq’s 2024 budget, approximately $2.7 billion has been allocated to the PMF. Official documents reveal that the PMF has expanded from around 110,000 fighters in 2016 to more than 230,000 military and civilian personnel by mid-2024 – an expansion with serious implications for the country’s political and security structures.
In response to the recent clashes, Hamid al-Yasiri, commander of Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyya, condemned the groups involved. Meanwhile, Abu Ali al-Askari, commander of Kataib Hezbollah, continued military activity with apparent disregard. This episode revealed widening internal rifts within the PMF, particularly between the Iran-aligned Wilayah PMF factions and the Najaf-aligned Atabat PMF, reflecting the ideological divide between forces loyal to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and those aligned with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf. On another front, Muqtada al-Sadr – known for his historically tense relationship with Iran – has pushed for the disarmament of the PMF, aiming to position himself as a political heir to Najaf’s religious authority in a possible post-Sistani era.
Meanwhile, some PMF-affiliated units – such as the Abbas Combat Division – have taken a markedly different stance. Officially affiliated with the shrine of Abbas in Karbala, the division maintains that it answers solely to the Najaf religious authority, not to any political party or armed faction. It has repeatedly asserted that the PMF is the product of a religious fatwa, created to defend Iraq, not to serve political or regional agendas. The division advocates for full legal regulation of the PMF, disarmament in line with state policy, and integration into Iraq’s official security forces – retaining only a reserve status for national defense emergencies.
This approach has included outspoken criticism of other PMF factions that have abused their legitimacy to gain political and economic influence. In official statements, the Abbas Division has condemned the alignment of some groups with regional axes – particularly Iran – and insisted that the PMF must remain strictly Iraqi. It also rejected further extensions of the PMF’s original mission, citing the 2019 declaration by Ayatollah Sistani that the collective jihad mandate had ended.
Ayatollah Sistani has repeatedly urged Iranian leaders to approve the integration of the PMF into the Iraqi army – a request reportedly discussed during previous visits by Iranian officials Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif to Najaf. These appeals, alongside shifting regional dynamics, reflect serious transformations in the balance of power. Among them: suspicious attacks on oil facilities in the Kurdistan Region, President Erdoğan’s decision to halt exports via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, and accusations of oil smuggling involving the KRG and certain PMF factions. All point to a regional crisis spilling over from post-war Syria into Iraq.
As Iraq approaches its November 2025 elections, it faces a web of intertwined crises: intra-Shiite rivalries, Sunni tribal tensions, ongoing conflict with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and spillover from Syria’s unresolved conflicts. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and current PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani are locked in a power struggle that extends to friction with PMF chief Faleh al-Fayyad. Maliki’s failed push to amend election laws – aimed at forcing premature resignations of executive officials – has further deepened divisions.
Conversely, Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, has aligned himself with al-Sudani. Despite this, Maliki, sharing hostility toward Muqtada al-Sadr, remains close to parliamentary factions like Khazali’s Sadiqoun Bloc. Khazali also maintains strong ties with Bafel Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), pushing the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) closer to Sunni and pro-Maliki blocs – a realignment that may help explain the recent explosions in KDP-controlled areas.
Sudani, meanwhile, has worked to establish more pragmatic and security-oriented ties with the United States. He has also improved coordination with the Kurds, approving salary payments for KRG employees as a political olive branch. Despite disputes over Kirkuk oil exports, Sudani has maintained strong ties with Turkey, positioning himself as a key interlocutor by committing to expel PKK forces from Iraqi territory – moves seen as efforts to strengthen ties with Ankara.
Still, the unpredictable nature of Muqtada al-Sadr may upend all calculations. While he has boycotted the election, a sudden return could force Shiite factions to close ranks once again. Should Sadr re-enter the political arena, Sunni and Kurdish factions may align with him. His ties to Saudi Arabia and the United States may also bring international leverage to his bloc – especially from actors keen on reducing Iranian influence in Iraq.
At the same time, Iran-aligned groups like Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Sayyid al-Shuhada, al-Nujaba, and Badr are in visible decline – financially strained and politically isolated since Iran’s regional influence began to wane. However, the return of ISIS through Syria and renewed chaos in Sunni regions could revive their relevance.
These dynamics also strengthen the hand of Sunni coalitions like that of Mohammad al-Halbousi. Should the U.S. and Turkey push more aggressively to reduce Iran’s leverage, an unexpected coalition between Sunnis, Sadrists, and Kurds may materialize. Cooperation between the Barzani and Talabani factions would likely accelerate this trend. Though Iran’s influence in the PUK remains notable, it now falls short of U.S. reach.
These developments may not occur overnight. But if U.S. influence weakens and sectarian rifts deepen – with new clerical figures entering the fray – Iraq’s internal fragmentation may accelerate. Meanwhile, growing instability in Syria, potential ISIS resurgence, and Kurdish-government clashes could draw KRG and PMF forces into shared conflict zones on Iraq’s border, with spillover into Sunni heartlands – setting the stage for a deeply destabilizing new war.
Despite not playing a major role in the current Iran-Israel tensions, Iranian-backed groups may soon be drawn into direct confrontation – granting Israel pretext for escalation, especially amid unprotected airspace over Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
In this context, IRGC-Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani’s recent visit to Iraq – meeting with Hadi al-Amiri, Ammar al-Hakim, and Nouri al-Maliki – reflects Tehran’s rising alarm. Reports suggest Qaani is deeply displeased with unauthorized drone strikes on Iraqi Kurdistan and is seeking to hold Baghdad as Iran’s last strategic bastion in the region.
While Tehran still exports significant volumes of oil via Iraq to bypass sanctions – and continues to supply electricity and gas despite an energy shortfall – it receives minimal payment due to U.S. sanctions. Iraq’s waiver to import Iranian gas expired in March, and Baghdad is now pursuing electricity imports from Turkey.
With waning financial clout, Tehran fears the loss of political and military influence in Iraq. Its allies in Baghdad now face unprecedented uncertainty, wary of confrontation with Washington and Israeli targeting. As a result, some may tactically distance themselves from Iran in the near future.
Tehran understands that the blueprint for the new Middle East passes through Iraq. For now, it may delay any strategic recalibration. Meanwhile, Gulf states like the UAE and Qatar are establishing backchannels with moderate PMF factions, seeking to isolate them from Iranian control.
Turkey, too, is building its political footprint in Nineveh, Salah al-Din, and Anbar, pushing for greater Sunni representation within the PMF structure. This effort includes the formation of tribal PMF units aligned with Sunni leaders close to Ankara, reportedly backed by Turkish intelligence as part of a broader strategy to rebalance Iraq’s security architecture.
The central question now looms: Can Iraq avoid becoming the next Syria or is Baghdad’s unraveling the prelude to regional instability that will inevitably spread into Iran itself?