We have made an interview with Ena Bavčić, a citizen of the Republika Srpska, one of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s three administrative units, and EU Advocacy Officer at the European Center for Press and Media Freedom, about the impact of the proposed Foreign Agents Law in the Republika Srpska on civil society and journalists.
How would you describe the current status of civil society in Republika Srpska (the Republic of Srpska is one of the three political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the others being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Brčko District), especially in terms of public perception, the judiciary, and government officials?
Civil society and independent media in Republika Srpska (which are largely part of the similar model of financing) have been targeted through smear campaigns for at least the past 15 years. So, in terms of public perception, this image has been unfortunately eroding for quite some time. However, the smear campaigns and the foreign agent law itself still attempt to undermine the work of the most reputable NGOs and independent media, who provide legal support and important policy and transitional justice work.
Currently, there are no cases of a clear judicial ban on work that I know of, but there have been a few cases of police raids on anti-corruption media, like Capital. It is important to emphasise that Republika Srpska is an entity that has a wide autonomy in certain aspects, but there is still the state-level NGO law, which is more relevant than the entity’s one. Thus, the implementation of the foreign agent law in Republika Srpska is complicated by the fact that NGOs can re-register themselves on a state level. In such a way, they can still receive foreign funding and circumvent certain aspects of the law, though not completely escape all obligations.
What kind of instruments and discourses are you using to counter anti-NGO or anti-opposition narratives?
The most important instrument that we can use is the facts, which are something that most of the targeted organisations and media have in abundance. But this alone is not sufficient. We have been building bridges and developing cooperation among different sectors in society to increase the number of allies and supporters. The media still has a certain power of shaping opinion, and we try to create collaborations between media, NGOs and activist groups, and political movements to create a broader support.
How does the Foreign Agent Law (FAL) in Republika Srpska affect its relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the judiciary, and the European Union?
Republika Srpska’s political establishment has undermined Bosnian and Herzegovinian institutions for sometime, through different direct and indirect means, creating a deep political crisis that cannot be resolved. So, FAL goes hand in hand with these exertions, but its main aim is to silence “internal” critics, so that people who have now been purged from politics, such as Dodik and his allies, would continue their corruption with impunity. All these attempts, of course, undermine every effort on the EU accession path and are created to decrease the importance and the image of the country in the international scene.
Which outside powers have an influence on Republika Srpska regarding this legislation?
The law and the steps preceding this law have almost completely mirrored the Russian one. So Russia does give inspiration and a certain level of backing to Dodik and his allies. But not only to him, other political parties are not immune to meddling with Russia, such as the largest party representing Bosnian Croats, the Croatian sister party, Croatian Christian Democrats, HDZ, have been exposed for their Russian ties. But the main partner for Republika Srpska’s government is in the Serbian government. And of course, a lot of inspiration is taken from Orban and the extreme right in Europe, such as the Austrian and French far-right. SNSD members (ruling party in Republika Srpska) have also attempted to get Trump as their ally, but so far not very successfully, as Trump’s government affirmed its commitment to territorial integrity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Does the Foreign Agent Law in Republika Srpska (RS) inspire or affect the Serbian government?
While Vučić still wants to appease the EU, he has Dodik to play his cards and divert attention from his actions in Serbia. So adopting FAL or criminalising defamation might be part of the act in which Vučić can portray himself as a voice of reason in the EU and a moderate option. Another role of more recent, secessionist moves in the RS is, among others, to divert attention from the protest and criticism Vučić is facing. This is becoming less effective, so in a way it could influence potential developments in Serbia, though I think if Serbia were to adopt a similar law, it would look more like a Hungarian one than the RS one.
Are the mass protests in Serbia connected in any way to the situation in Republika Srpska?
As mentioned above, Vučić and the Serbian government often use Serbs in other countries to divert attention from internal matters that he may be facing. So every time there is some criticism of his work, suddenly a crisis in Bosnia (RS) and/or Kosovo comes up.
However, this law was adopted some six months before the protests in Serbia started, and it is, I believe, more oriented towards the Republika Srpska establishment’s attempts to maintain their impunity. People in Republika Srpska, though, closely follow the protests in Serbia and understand the repression as this is something that they have witnessed from this entity’s government in the wake of Justice for David, the largest protests ever happening in this part of the country.
Do you receive solidarity from international organisations, neighbouring countries, or other foreign NGOs?
Since I am not currently based in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republika Srpska, I can speak on behalf of those offering solidarity. There are certainly many lessons to be learned and shared among activists and journalists from countries affected by FALs, and this is what the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom seeks to promote. We have closely followed the developments and communicated with locals to determine the best course of action. However, from this position, it is difficult to confidently assess how much daily change this solidarity actually fosters.
In the EU, the main topic from the region today is protests in Serbia, and while they are significant, and journalists there are doing courageous work in documenting and alerting to all pressures, we must not overlook Republika Srpska and the issues journalists may face there. Therefore, we endeavour to mainstream journalists’ rights across the entire region and highlight potential cross-cutting issues in our statements.
Could you share some examples of solidarity initiatives or areas of support?
In 2023, Media Freedom Rapid Response conducted a mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and part of the visit was to Banja Luka. There, our representatives discussed the proposed FAL and ways to react to it. Ever since, we have been raising awareness of these threats through reports, events, meetings, and statements. Most recently, the ECPMF-led MFRR half-year report provides an entire chapter on FALs and on Bosnia and Herzegovina, where we discuss the law in Republika Srpska. We will also use the upcoming MFRR Summit to platform a colleague from Transparency International in BiH who has long been targeted (if not the main target) of these initiatives, but they have also most vehemently disputed them.
Besides us, I know that the European Centre for Non-Profit Law works closely with NGOs in Republika Srpska to help them find the best administrative solutions to their particular position.
It is important to keep these initiatives going and to continue shedding light on issues faced by people affected by FAL in BiH and elsewhere, to avoid the normalisation of their situation.