In May 2024, the Georgian Parliament introduced a “foreign agent law,” sparking intense debates and mass protests across the country. Officially termed the “foreign influence” legislation, the law severely restricts the operational space of civil society. It requires non-governmental organizations and media outlets that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register themselves as “organizations serving the interests of a foreign power.” This provision imposes heavy bureaucratic obligations and sensitive reporting requirements, while non-compliance results in substantial fines and vaguely defined criminal charges.
The ruling Georgian Dream Party argues that this legislation will enhance transparency in the financing of civil society organizations and prevent foreign interference. Critics, however, contend that the law will undermine democratic norms and derail Georgia’s path toward European Union membership. Importantly, this polarized debate is not a sudden development but rather the continuation of a long-standing struggle in Georgian politics, dating back to the country’s 1991 independence and its oscillation between Western integration and Russian influence.
Post-Soviet Georgia
Upon gaining independence in 1991, Georgia emerged as a fragile state. Like other post-Soviet republics, it faced severe challenges in state-building while simultaneously contending with ethnic divisions. Separatist conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, internal strife, and the oscillation between nationalism and pragmatism in its relations with Russia made this a turbulent period. These security challenges rendered Georgia highly susceptible to international intervention, opening space not only for Russia but also for Europe and the United States to engage in political and civil society domains.
The 2003 Rose Revolution marked a turning point, as Mikheil Saakashvili adopted a foreign policy centered on Western integration, pursuing NATO membership and closer relations with the European Union. These choices, however, provoked intensified Russian pressure in the form of economic embargoes, diplomatic crises, and escalating security tensions. While Saakashvili at times attempted to reduce hostilities with Moscow, such initiatives proved unsuccessful.
Despite limited success in Adjara, peace efforts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia collapsed. Georgia’s 2008 military intervention in South Ossetia triggered a direct Russian military response and Moscow’s recognition of the separatist territories. Saakashvili’s insistence on NATO membership and pro-Western discourse was perceived by Russia as a strategic threat, turning Georgia’s territorial integrity into an issue deeply entangled with international power politics.
This period of turbulence produced sharp fluctuations in Georgia’s foreign policy orientations, leading to a more pragmatic recalibration of its international alliances in the post-Saakashvili era. Although successive governments maintained rhetorical commitments to Euro-Atlantic integration, they simultaneously pursued more cautious strategies toward Russia. The debates surrounding the current foreign agent law thus raise broader questions of whether Georgia is backtracking on its Western orientation and seeking a new equilibrium with Russia.
The Georgian Dream Party’s Authoritarian Turn
The Georgian Dream Party came to power in October 2012, ending the Saakashvili era. In its campaign, the party pledged to sustain Georgia’s trajectory of Western integration while also easing tensions with Russia. This strategy was presented as a “pragmatic” balance, aimed at preventing a repeat of the 2008 war.
In its early years, the Georgian Dream government indeed took steps toward Europe: the EU Association Agreement was signed in June 2014, and a NATO training center was established in 2015. Party leaders emphasized their support for EU accession and NATO membership, aligning themselves with the pro-Western preferences of the majority of the Georgian public.
Over time, however, the party adopted increasingly authoritarian policies. The Rustavi 2 television case revealed mounting government pressure on independent media, while polarization of private broadcasters further deepened political divides. These restrictions soon extended to civil society organizations, which had become central actors in defending liberal democratic values and European integration. In 2023, party founder Bidzina Ivanishvili labeled civil society representatives as “fake elites” and “revolutionary instigators,” signaling a direct challenge to their legitimacy.
The ruling party systematically used its power against civil society and eroded the separation of powers and checks and balances. Judicial control was a key manifestation: the 2021 arrest of United National Movement leader Nika Melia and the imprisonment of former President Saakashvili highlighted the politicization of the judiciary. By shaping the political arena in this way, Georgian Dream entrenched an unequal and undemocratic system. These developments not only blocked Georgia’s EU candidacy status in June 2022 but also led to U.S. State Department visa restrictions on Georgian judges and prosecutors in 2023.
Despite approximately 20% of its territory being under Russian occupation, Georgia remains constrained in its ability to pursue independent policies from Moscow. The war in Ukraine further demonstrated this limitation: the Georgian Dream government refrained from openly criticizing Russia, while trade relations expanded significantly. In 2022, Georgian exports to Russia increased by 6.8% to $652 million, while imports from Russia rose by 79% to $1.8 billion, reaching the highest level in sixteen years.
Understanding the emergence of the foreign agent law requires situating it within Georgia’s broader post-Soviet trajectory, shaped by its relations with both the West and Russia. Pivotal moments such as the Rose Revolution, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and the EU integration process illustrate a short but highly intense historical trajectory.
With a population of roughly 3.7 million and a GDP of $30 billion, Georgia may be small in scale, yet it occupies a critical position in the geopolitical competition between the European Union and Russia. Although it possesses a vibrant civil society, rising authoritarianism and deepening polarization render its democratization process increasingly fragile.
The foreign agent law exemplifies this authoritarian trajectory, functioning much like its Russian counterpart in suppressing the very civil society actors that represent the country’s last hope for democratic resilience. For this reason, Georgians widely refer to it as the “Russian Law.”
Bibliography
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Matsaberidze, D. (2015). Russia vs. EU/US through Georgia and Ukraine. Connections, 14(2), 77–86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326399
Spetschinsky, L., & Bolgova, I. V. (2014). Post-Soviet or Post-Colonial? The relations between Russia and Georgia after 1991. European Review of International Studies, 1(3), 110-122.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/08/georgia-media-freedom-risk#:~:text=“A%20government
https://www.rferl.org/a/georgian-us-eu-relations-georgian-dream-elections/33040274.html