We made an interview with human rights defender and civil society activist Tamta Mikeladze about Georgia’s foreign agent law and its impact on civil society.
How do you describe the current status of civil society in Georgia with regard to the perception of the public opinion, judiciary and government officials? And what kind of instruments and discourses are you using to counter any anti-NGO, anti-opposition narrative?
Critical, well-organized, and diverse civil society has always been a central pillar of Georgian democracy. However, historically, civil society in Georgia developed primarily as a sector supported from the top down, largely driven by international donors. In the context of the political and economic crises of the 1990s, when the country faced deep poverty, economic inequality, humanitarian crises, and was embroiled in wars, it was virtually impossible for civil society to emerge organically from the bottom up. This does not mean that examples of affective and conventional solidarity did not exist during that period and in subsequent years—on the level of families, communities, and neighborhoods—but these did not constitute a liberal understanding of civil society, which is grounded in shared values, democratic rules of the game, pluralism, autonomy, and diversity.
Support for democracy in Georgia has always involved substantial institutional and financial backing for civil society, enabling organizations to become strong, well-structured, and socially connected, with extensive networks both domestically and internationally. Yet, the visions of the country’s future held by civil society organizations in this period were largely shaped by neoliberal ideas and the beliefs associated with American liberal democracy. In the following years, civil society became increasingly diverse and heterogeneous. Particularly after 2012, the sector diversified further, with the emergence of ideologically driven organizations and collectives. Ideological conflicts arose among organizations, collectives, and movements, which was a positive development, making the discursive field in Georgia more pluralistic. Progressive ideas and beliefs around social solidarity, equality, and bottom-up democratization emerged. Numerous movements arose advocating concrete demands for social policy reform. At the same time, community-based organizations working with marginalized and vulnerable populations strengthened significantly, making visible the experiences of oppression and exclusion faced by these groups.
In this context, autonomous actors emerged that adhered to specific ideologies and did not align with the development paradigms and theoretical frameworks promoted by Western organizations. Despite these advances, the sector still struggled to support agendas perceived from the bottom up and to articulate the social and economic grievances of the population. Dominant NGOs continued to focus primarily on political and civil rights, supporting the idea of a small state. At the same time, civil society organizations consistently struggled to establish deeper, sustained connections with broader communities, including durable networks of trust and solidarity. Most organizations remained oriented toward accelerated reforms and Europeanization, with theories of change that operated top-down, relying on influencing international institutions rather than directly engaging local constituencies.
Since the Georgian government adopted an anti-European course in 2023, and local policy change became impossible under pressure and recommendations from the Global North, civil society increasingly shifted toward local, direct action and self-organization. It should be noted that civil society has effectively risen to this challenge, confronting Georgian Dream’s authoritarianism in a highly efficient manner. Nevertheless, in the context of intensive and aggressive authoritarianism, civil society as an institution has been significantly weakened and practically disempowered. Despite this, the individuals working in the sector continue their work and advocacy with remarkable dedication, gaining a unique experience of resilience.
Thus, the criticisms leveled at civil society in new democracies regarding its formation and construction are both legitimate and relevant in the Georgian context. It is important, however, to approach these critiques with nuance and to recognize the internal conflicts, divergences, contradictions, and diversity that exist—and will continue to exist—within the sector.
Returning to the present reality, the Georgian Dream government currently employs aggressive anti-NGO rhetoric, portraying civil society actors as foreign agents, radicals, extremists, and wealthy elites, echoing Russian-style authoritarian language and discourses. In this context, where institutional power is monopolized by the state, defending oneself through legal or judicial channels has become extremely challenging. Conservative and clerical forces have methodically sought to demonize civil society, eroding public trust. Under these conditions, public attitudes toward NGOs have remained largely neutral, with few strongly positive perceptions.
However, the situation has begun to change. When Georgian Dream escalated attacks against civil society, including attempts to implement Russian-style restrictive laws, the public increasingly recognized these actions as symptoms of authoritarian backsliding and an anti-European foreign policy turn. This shift generated broader support for civil society, positively influencing public perception.
Our strategy to counter these discursive attacks involves active engagement and the demonstration of the social purpose of our work. We aim to reveal that the government seeks to silence critical advocacy for workers, displaced persons, low-income populations, environmental protection, women, children, and people with disabilities, as well as to conceal corruption and systemic abuses.
How do you describe the real reach of civil society? Who are the dissidents, partners and allies of civil society? How wide can NGOs affect public discourse?
Civil society in Georgia currently enjoys strong support from segments of the population actively engaged in protests, which have persisted for over 300 days against authoritarian and anti-European policies. Protesters clearly understand that the dismantling of human rights infrastructures leaves citizens vulnerable to state violence and repression, and the initial steps of authoritarian rollback in Georgia coincided strategically with targeted actions against NGOs. In this context, our immediate allies are the citizens participating in the protests, including young people and students who are directly engaged in defending their rights and the democratic space.
At the same time, donors and international organizations are attempting to respond to the crisis, and we hope that their coordination will soon take more tangible forms. Particularly important for us is the establishment of flexible support, accompanied by sensitive approaches focused on our safety and organizational survival.
Our current goal is to respond to the human rights crisis and the sharp deterioration of civil and political rights in Georgia, ensuring that citizens are not left isolated. Simultaneously, we aim to analyze the systemic and historical roots of authoritarianism in Georgia, exploring how this crisis can be halted and the country redirected toward democratic governance. In this regard, our organization focuses on the vulnerabilities within society and the political system, envisioning pathways out of the crisis that are holistic and systemic. This approach emphasizes not only leadership changes but also structural transformations, where citizen empowerment occurs in economic, political, and cultural terms. It seeks to shift the dominant paradigm—from one centered on elites, economic growth, and security—toward a model focused on people, wellbeing, and freedom.
For us, this protest and the ongoing resistance in Georgia are not merely acts of decolonial struggle under the conditions of Russia’s hybrid warfare, which ultimately defend our European future; they are also a fight for genuine democracy. Whereas in previous years our struggle focused on national liberation or opposition to personalized authoritarian rule, today it carries a positive agenda. Citizens are not only rejecting figures like Bidzina Ivanishvili; they are demanding a genuine, bottom-up organized democracy and a dignified life for all. The narrative emerging from grassroots movements, which equally encompasses economic, social, and cultural rights, generates a new strategic impulse for Georgian democracy. This impulse does not merely represent destructive resistance to authoritarianism; it actively constructs a positive, popular form of democracy, rooted in the agency, participation, and aspirations of ordinary citizens.
It should be emphasized that the ongoing protests largely embrace progressive political ideas. Even in the absence of centralized leadership, the authenticity and self-organization of the movement are evident. In this sense, the protest and its broader community constitute a remarkable story of civil society emerging from the bottom up. While institutional civil society is being systematically weakened, a genuinely decentralized civil society is being born, rooted in grassroots participation, autonomous initiatives, and local engagement.
To what extent do you receive legal and administrative pressure, threat or restriction with regards to the foreign agent law?
In recent months, we have witnessed the systematic crackdown and de-institutionalization of civil society in Georgia. The Georgian Dream government, in 2024–2025, introduced laws targeting civil society that effectively stigmatize, criminalize, and make grant funding contingent on political discretion. The Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (2024) applies to NGOs receiving over 20% of their income from foreign sources, requiring mandatory registration as organizations “acting in the interest of a foreign power,” with non-compliance resulting in a 25,000 GEL fine and extensive monitoring by the Ministry of Justice, including access to sensitive data. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (2025), inspired by U.S. FARA but with more aggressive enforcement, requires biannual re-registration, mandatory public labeling as a foreign agent, and criminal liability for non-compliance, including fines up to 10,000 GEL or imprisonment up to five years. The law grants broad discretion to the Anti-Corruption Bureau for court interrogations, property seizures, and data extraction, creating a high risk of arbitrary enforcement. At the same time, amendments to the Law on Grants introduced governmental approval requirements for all grant receipt, with unauthorized grants penalized at double the amount. The law defines grants broadly, including technical assistance and in-kind contributions, and restricts their use strictly to contract purposes. Any modifications require approval from both government and donors, and lack of approval effectively denies funding.
These laws operate simultaneously, creating a chilling effect that has forced many organizations to suspend activities.
After the adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence in 2024, many civil society organizations, particularly those working in regions and local communities, came under severe pressure. Some were forced to halt their activities, while others significantly reduced their operations. In February 2025, the shutdown of USAID projects and the resulting heavy financial impacts further weakened civil society groups. Many organizations could no longer sustain their work or secure new funding. Later, the adoption of a FARA-type law and changes to the law on grants exacerbated the situation. By June 2025, numerous NGOs had fully halted their operations, closed their bank accounts, and suspended all activities due to the criminal and financial risks imposed by these regulations.
Following this, the Georgian Dream government began targeting active and critical organizations, aiming to punish and silence them. The government accelerated monitoring of active organizations, targeting at least ten under FARA provisions and thirty under the grants law, as well as seizing the bank accounts of nine organizations, effectively paralyzing their operations. These seizures occurred within the framework of a highly politicized investigation under charges of sabotage, with authorities asserting that civil society organizations, political parties, media outlets, academic institutions, and student movements were allegedly organizing a revolution in Georgia. However, the arguments and evidence presented during the investigation were so unfounded and absurd that it is evident this represents yet another attempt to politicize the justice system.
The case of our own organization, the Social Justice Center, is particularly illustrative. Over the past three months, the state has initiated three separate legal inspections against us, ultimately seizing our bank accounts and effectively paralyzing our operations. These laws and administrative practices systematically destroy and institutionally dismantle civil society.
Within a single year, the Georgian Dream government enacted measures resembling authoritarian practices that, in other countries such as Russia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus, took a decade to establish. This is both alarming and almost unbelievable.
Do you get any solidarity outside your country from international organizations, neighbouring countries and fellow foreign NGOs? Can you give any examples of solidarity areas?
We are actively seeking knowledge and experience from Belarusian, Azerbaijani, and Russian activists, while exploring new ways to sustain our teams and continue critical public work. In the past, we did not fully recognize the value of this experience and could not have imagined that our reality would demand it, but now we are compelled to engage with and learn from these previously overlooked lessons.
Although donor communities were not fully prepared for this rapid crackdown, international organizations and INGOs play a crucial role in providing solidarity and strategic support. It is essential that their coordination and efforts continue to strengthen.
What we are currently striving for is a critical reflection on our future and on our modus operandi. Given the rapidly deteriorating environment for civil society in Georgia, adopting a rhizomatic strategy, inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s metaphor, has become essential. Unlike hierarchical or tree-like structures, a rhizome has no single center, predetermined direction of growth, or unified order. Its components emerge and dissipate autonomously, interconnected through a shared environment. Applying this concept to civil society, it becomes clear that traditional, centralized approaches are increasingly vulnerable in the face of political repression. To support a “rhizomatic” civil society effectively, it is crucial to move away from centralization, homogenization, or standardized solutions.
This approach requires the development of distributed and resilient strategies that preserve organizational diversity and autonomy, encourage initiative while maintaining independent decision-making, and enable rapid adaptation to changing circumstances without reliance on a single authority. Practically, this means that much of our work now occurs outside conventional public spaces, often underground or through voluntary engagement. Whereas previously civil society operated openly, relying on visible advocacy and institutional presence, current realities demand a complete reorientation. Organizations must navigate hostile conditions by decentralizing their activities, fostering networks of trust, and creating flexible, autonomous structures that can respond to crises swiftly and effectively.
In this framework, rhizomatic civil society is not merely a survival mechanism but a strategic response to systemic authoritarianism. It allows activists and organizations to maintain operational continuity, continue supporting vulnerable communities, and produce critical locally-rooted knowledge. By embracing this model, civil society can cultivate resilience, protect its human and institutional capital, and ensure that the democratic aspirations of the population are sustained even under extreme repression.
Our reflections on the future are ongoing, and the process of shaping it is still underway. It is difficult to predict exactly how our future will develop, where we will succeed, or where we may face setbacks. Nevertheless, this remains an extremely valuable experience, and it is crucial that we derive the maximum lessons from it, emerging stronger as both collectives and individuals.
Once again, the power of solidarity, exchange, and networks cannot be overstated. We need these more than ever. Without them, it would be almost impossible to resist the growing authoritarianism and neo-conservative, fascist-leaning movements and policies at a global level.