Authors: Anıl Kılıç, Murat Pehlivanoğlu and Ezio Sorti
A Combined Analysis of Europe’s Defense Transformation and Türkiye’s Emerging Role
Introduction
Europe’s defense landscape is being reshaped by a convergence of shocks: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, mounting doubts over Washington’s long-term security commitment, and the realization that European militaries and industries are neither large nor fast enough for the threats they now face. The three articles brought together here approach this transformation from three different, complementary angles, and read together they form a fuller picture of what “European rearmament” actually means in practice.
The first piece looks inward, at the political and social costs of militarization. It argues that Europe’s turn toward defense spending is not simply a budgetary adjustment but a challenge to the continent’s postwar identity as a welfare state, and it warns that once a defense-industrial complex becomes entrenched, it will be difficult to reverse even if the security climate eventually improves.
The second piece looks outward, at Türkiye’s place in this new order. It argues that the European Union’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” and Türkiye’s decades-long drive for an indigenous defense industry are not competing projects but overlapping ones, and that deeper industrial cooperation with Ankara, despite lingering political mistrust, could strengthen rather than dilute Europe’s own strategic independence.
The third piece grounds these arguments in a concrete case: the fast-developing defense partnership between Italy and Türkiye, symbolized by the Leonardo–Baykar joint venture and Baykar’s acquisition of Piaggio Aerospace. It argues that this bilateral relationship is a preview of a broader trend, in which Türkiye is being drawn into Europe’s defense architecture piece by piece, through industrial deals rather than formal accession.
Taken together, the three articles trace a single arc: why Europe is rearming, why Türkiye is emerging as an indispensable partner in that effort, and what this shift could cost Europe at home. The sections below are presented in that order, each with its own references preserved as in the original.
Part I. The Other Dimension of Europe’s Identity Transformation Under Militarization: From Welfare State to What?
By Anıl Kılıç
Guns, Butter, and Brussels
The European Union (EU) was given the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. This is because the EU has helped peace, democracy, human rights, and integration for over 60 years. This was not very surprising because the EU’s historical legitimacy has largely relied on its self-image as a post war peace project. The destruction caused by the Second World War provided strong justification for making even the idea of another war, or armed conflict unthinkable. Besides, there is another factor that distinguishes the Union from others in history. According to the traditional Westphalian frame, the concept of sovereignty was kind of sacred for statehood. Revolutionarily, EU member states voluntarily transferred part of their sovereignty to supranational European institutions. This experience made the EU’s integration and enlargement processes unique. However, current security threats are testing the EU’s self-identification as a normative power.
When Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU was forced to interrogate the adequacy of its own security capacity. The EU has directly endorsed Ukraine, and provided substantial financial and military assistance during the war. This generous support rapidly depleted Europe’s military stocks and revealed how weak and fragile its capacity was to refill them quickly. In other words, if Vladimir Putin dares to attack an EU member state, the EU may not have the full capacity to defend itself. This was a jeopardy too significant to be ignored. Fortunately, the NATO umbrella and the military power of the United States (US) still provided a strong degree of deterrence against unpredictable monsters.
NATO’s strength depends not only on how many tanks, planes, and soldiers it has, but also on the belief that the US would actually help if needed. If this belief weakens, aggressive actors such as Russia may become more willing to take risks. Secondly, Europe may be forced to take great responsibility for its own defense. Europeans have been familiar with President Trump’s critical rhetoric towards NATO. Yet, his stated desire to annex Greenland, an autonomous territory belonging to NATO ally Denmark, caused a profound loss of trust in Europe toward the transatlantic relationship. It became clear that Europe should no longer be unconditionally dependent on the United States for its security.
At this point, the question arises of whether the European Union will sacrifice its own identity. Considering identity, it is generally mentioned as a transition from peaceful/normative power to geopolitical actor. However, a more important transition needs to be discussed, but European leaders are not paying sufficient attention to it. The identity that has legitimized the EU’s common values, currently at risk of being eroded, is the identity of the welfare state. It is not a basic concept. It refers to an institutional form of governance in which the state guarantees a minimum level of well-being for its citizens through social rights, public services, and redistributive policies in response to the income inequalities, social risks, and life insecurities generated by the capitalist market order.
The welfare state mechanism is a guarantee that does not leave citizens’ futures entirely to the market. It is the kind of social contract that reflects the idea of healthcare, education, social security, and pensions. But it does not basically mean that the state spends its resources directly to finance its citizens. Rather, as a social contract, it was established by political elites with their citizens to legitimize the idea of the EU being resilient. It was, in fact, successful. Compared to US society, EU citizens possessed these social rights to a much greater extent. Therefore, the notion of a welfare state is not a regular budgetary item. It constitutes the social foundation of European democracy.
The explicit danger is that every euro invested in militarization will be automatically taken from schools, hospitals, and pensions. Nevertheless, the hidden danger concerns the restructuring of Europe’s political priorities. The change in budget allocation priorities from social spending to defense urgencies will create outcomes that directly affect European citizens’ everyday lives. At this stage, social expenditures can be delayed, welfare spending can be framed as unaffordable, and fiscal discipline can be made to serve security elites first. In such a Europe, citizens may come to see the EU as less of a beneficial project for them. While political elites in Brussels design Europe’s strategic autonomy for external threats, they do not wish to relinquish domestic legitimacy. For that reason, they will run into debt in order to sustain the social expenditures that are integral to the welfare state identity. At this point, a new challenge appears.
European states will need to rely on increased borrowing in order to finance both their militarization endeavors and the social spending demanded by the welfare state. Compounding this, tensions between the US-Israel bloc and Iran recently led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and global energy supply suffered a harsh shock as a result: Brent crude oil futures rose rapidly from 70 USD to 120 USD. Economists have begun to discuss whether this could trigger a supply-driven global inflation wave. In response to such a dangerous inflation wave, central banks possess a familiar policy remedy: interest-rate hikes. This, in fact, happened: on 11 May 2026, the European Central Bank (ECB) raised interest rates by 25 basis points. If inflation concerns continue, markets will anticipate further rate increases from the ECB. In short, Europe will face higher borrowing costs in trying to finance both militarization and social expenditures at full capacity.
Janan Ganesh shares his views on this topic in his Financial Times article titled “Europe Must Trim Its Welfare State to Build a Warfare State.”
His recommendation is that Europe should make crucial cuts to social spending in order to defend itself. In other words, the welfare state should be compromised to build a reinforced warfare state. Given the extraordinary circumstances Europe currently faces, this may appear to be a logical option. However, as argued earlier, Europe’s welfare state identity is not something that can easily be abandoned or sacrificed. The dilemma is often framed as “guns vs. butter,” but in fact it is not a simple matter of political preference. It is directly tied to the identity transformation of Europe.
As the Russian threat becomes increasingly tangible, Europe’s militarization is no longer a matter of preference but of imperative. Consequently, an expansion of EU resources devoted to security and the defense industry is now unavoidable. This new circumstance will reinforce Europe’s own military-industrial complex — and Europe has watched this film before. The United States made huge investments in military capabilities during periods of war and geopolitical tension. Over time, the defense industry companies that benefited from these investments began to coordinate with one another and engage in lobbying to affect US decision-making processes; in other words, they became institutionalized as a strong political actor. The EU is still at an early stage of militarization and should draw lessons from the US experience. If Europe advances its defense-industrial complex rapidly, it must simultaneously construct oversight mechanisms, transparency safeguards, and accountability structures. Otherwise, when conditions stabilize and a more peaceful international atmosphere returns, the EU may seek to redirect resources from military expenditure back toward social spending to reconstruct the welfare state — and at that moment, it could encounter coercive pressure from defense-industrial corporations resisting any effort to reduce military investment. Once defense expenditure becomes institutionalized, it is no longer perceived as a temporary answer to crisis; by contrast, welfare expenditures begin to be discussed as a recurring fiscal burden.
To sum up, militarization will reshape budgets, fiscal discipline, institutions, priorities, and ultimately the meaning of European identity. Political elites in Brussels remain reluctant to sacrifice the EU’s welfare state identity, and the European Parliament’s position demonstrates this well: while the EU’s economic coordination mechanisms frequently recommend cuts to social spending, the Parliament adopted a resolution in March 2026 stating that defense spending should not come at the expense of other policies nor be financed by increased debt. The ongoing identity transformation from welfare state to warfare state will nonetheless change EU citizens’ everyday lives. It will be utterly difficult to convince those who have spent their entire lives under strong social guarantees, and who have been promised the same guarantees for their children, that a European Union stripped of its welfare state identity is still a project worth protecting.
References
Ganesh, J. “Europe Must Trim Its Welfare State to Build a Warfare State.” Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/37053b2b-ccda-4ce3-a25d-f1d0f82e7989?syn-25a6b1a6=1
European Parliament. “Parliament’s Economic, Employment and Social Priorities for 2026.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260306IPR37530/parliament-s-economic-employment-and-social-priorities-for-2026
Part II. Reading Türkiye–European Union Defence Industrial Cooperation Through the Dilemma of Strategic Autonomy and Indigenous Defence Industrialisation
By Murat Pehlivanoğlu
Introduction
The transformation of the European security architecture following the Russia–Ukraine War has made it imperative to reassess the security dimension of Türkiye–European Union (EU) relations. For many years, bilateral relations were primarily shaped by accession negotiations, democratization, and political conditionality. Today, however, the relationship is increasingly discussed within the framework of security cooperation and defence industrial collaboration. In this new strategic environment, the intersection of the EU’s concept of strategic autonomy and Türkiye’s vision of an indigenous and national defence industry constitutes one of the most significant dimensions of bilateral relations. Although these approaches initially appear to represent different security paradigms, both fundamentally seek to reduce external dependence on critical technologies and strengthen autonomous decision-making capacity in defence and security policies (Efe, 2007; Yücel, 2023).
The European Union’s renewed emphasis on strategic autonomy gained particular momentum following the uncertainties in transatlantic relations during the Trump administration and became substantially more prominent after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine War. The EU increasingly recognizes that relying exclusively on the United States for its security architecture is neither politically nor strategically sustainable in the long term. Consequently, strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base has become one of the Union’s primary strategic objectives (Yücel, 2023).
Türkiye, however, embarked upon a similar trajectory much earlier. The arms embargoes imposed after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation constituted a major turning point that accelerated the country’s determination to establish an indigenous defence industrial base. Since then, the pursuit of technological self-reliance has become one of the fundamental pillars of Türkiye’s national security strategy (Kurç, 2026).
Within this context, the European Union should not merely be regarded as an export market for Türkiye’s expanding defence industry. Rather, it represents an indispensable strategic partner in terms of advanced technologies, joint production, research and development, critical subsystem manufacturing, and access to sophisticated defence supply chains. Although Türkiye has achieved remarkable progress in unmanned systems, land platforms, naval platforms, and electronic warfare technologies, cooperation with European partners in high-end engineering, propulsion systems, and critical technologies would significantly contribute to transforming the current horizontal expansion of the sector into vertical technological advancement (Kurç, 2026).
Likewise, from the European perspective, Türkiye should no longer be perceived solely as NATO’s second-largest military force. In light of Europe’s post-war challenges — including production bottlenecks, ammunition shortages, and disruptions in defence supply chains — Türkiye offers complementary capabilities through its cost-effective industrial production, mature defence companies, highly qualified workforce, and extensive operational experience.
The combination of the European Union’s technological infrastructure, industrial capacity, and decades-long experience within the transatlantic defence network with Türkiye’s flexible production capability could establish a more reliable framework of mutual interdependence. Such cooperation would contribute not only to the sustainability of the European defence industrial base but also to the construction of a more resilient collective security architecture. Rather than weakening strategic autonomy, this approach would reinforce it through trusted partnerships based on reciprocal dependence (Tan, 2021).
For decades, prolonged uncertainty surrounding Türkiye’s accession process has generated institutional fatigue and mutual distrust between the parties. Reframing bilateral relations around defence industrial cooperation instead of accession negotiations could therefore create a new foundation for rebuilding confidence. Replacing the perception of an indefinitely “waiting candidate country” with an equal partnership based on shared strategic interests may open new avenues for institutional cooperation.
In this respect, the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and Türkiye’s indigenous defence industrialisation strategy should not be interpreted as competing or mutually exclusive concepts. Instead, they should be viewed as overlapping strategic approaches that pursue similar objectives through different historical experiences. Rather than aiming for absolute independence by eliminating all forms of external dependence, both actors would benefit from managing strategic interdependence through reliable institutional partnerships (Kurç, 2026).
Türkiye’s policy during the Russia–Ukraine War illustrates this argument. While maintaining diplomatic channels with Russia, Türkiye simultaneously contributed significantly to Ukraine’s defence capacity. Its implementation of the Montreux Convention, facilitation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and provision of defence-related support demonstrate that Türkiye’s multidimensional foreign policy should be understood not merely as a source of strategic ambiguity but also as an important contributor to European security and regional crisis management (Yücel, 2023).
Despite these contributions, the European Union has often interpreted Türkiye’s multidimensional foreign policy primarily through the lens of strategic distrust. Bilateral disputes involving Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration have, at times, influenced the EU’s collective security outlook and constrained the development of institutional defence cooperation. Consequently, the European Union should reconsider its strategic autonomy agenda by recognizing the potential contribution of Türkiye as a long-term defence industrial partner rather than viewing the relationship exclusively through unresolved political disputes (Efe, 2007; Hürsoy, 2005).
Türkiye’s Defence Industrial Capacity and Technological Cooperation with Europe
Türkiye’s progress in the defence industry over the past two decades should be assessed not merely in terms of quantitative expansion but also through the lenses of technological transformation and institutional capacity building. Public policies have undoubtedly played a significant role in this process; however, the increasing production capabilities of private defence companies and their integration into international markets have become equally decisive. Nevertheless, sustaining this level of development requires deeper technology-oriented cooperation with European partners. As emphasized by Kurç, Türkiye’s long-term technological advancement depends not only on expanding domestic production but also on becoming integrated into international defence production networks and high-technology partnerships (Kurç, 2026).
According to the data published by the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), Türkiye’s defence industrial ecosystem has evolved into an internationally competitive production base comprising approximately 3,500 companies, more than 100,000 highly qualified employees, and over 1,400 active defence projects (Presidency of Defence Industries, 2024). Although this remarkable expansion has significantly strengthened the country’s defence capabilities, much of this growth has been achieved through the adaptation, localization, and incremental improvement of existing technologies. The principal challenge for the coming decade is therefore to transform this horizontal expansion into vertical technological progress through indigenous innovation, advanced engineering, and critical subsystem development. Joint research and development projects, technology-sharing arrangements, and co-production mechanisms with the European Union could play a decisive role in facilitating this transition (Kurç, 2026).
From Türkiye’s perspective, the European Union should therefore be regarded not only as an export destination but also as a strategic partner capable of contributing advanced engineering expertise, propulsion technologies, electronic subsystems, certification processes, and collaborative innovation mechanisms. Likewise, the European Union should move beyond perceiving Türkiye solely as a military ally within NATO and instead recognize its growing defence industrial ecosystem as a valuable contributor to Europe’s future defence production capacity. Türkiye’s competitive production costs, operational experience, flexible manufacturing capability, and expanding defence industrial infrastructure position it as a complementary partner within the emerging European defence technological and industrial base (Tan, 2021).
The experience of the Altay Main Battle Tank project illustrates this reality particularly well. Difficulties encountered in acquiring engines and powertrain systems demonstrated that complete technological independence remains extremely difficult within today’s globally interconnected defence industrial networks. These challenges reveal not only Türkiye’s continuing dependence on critical technologies but also the importance of establishing reliable technological partnerships with European countries. Similarly, considering the European Union’s own dependence on the United States in several critical defence technologies, neither side appears capable of achieving complete strategic autonomy in the short or medium term. Consequently, strategic autonomy should not be interpreted as complete technological isolation but rather as the capacity to manage interdependence through trusted partnerships (Kurç, 2026).
The European Union’s Perspective: Trust as the Missing Component
From the European Union’s perspective, several political and institutional challenges continue to hinder the establishment of long-term defence industrial partnerships with Türkiye. The Union consistently emphasizes that cooperation in defence and security should be based upon mutual trust, predictability, shared democratic values, and respect for the rule of law. Consequently, discussions concerning Türkiye’s domestic political developments, judicial independence, and democratic governance have frequently been incorporated into debates surrounding defence cooperation (Yücel, 2023).
However, it would be misleading to attribute the existing trust deficit solely to Türkiye. The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, together with the subsequent operation of the unanimity principle in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, has significantly complicated the institutional framework of Türkiye–EU relations. Furthermore, the EU’s failure to adequately appreciate Türkiye’s early warnings regarding regional security risks before the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine War also raises questions concerning the Union’s own strategic foresight. Consequently, the deficit of mutual trust should be understood as the product of reciprocal strategic perceptions rather than the responsibility of one party alone (Efe, 2007; Hürsoy, 2005).
Today, Türkiye possesses a sophisticated defence industrial infrastructure, a highly qualified workforce, NATO-standard production capabilities, and an expanding record of defence exports to both NATO allies and European countries. These developments suggest that Türkiye’s role within the future European security architecture deserves renewed consideration. Allowing long-standing political disputes associated with Türkiye’s candidate status to dominate defence industrial cooperation risks preventing both sides from benefiting from substantial opportunities in technology, production, and security cooperation (Presidency of Defence Industries, 2024).
Successful Examples of Defence Industrial Cooperation
Despite persistent political disagreements, several successful defence industrial projects demonstrate that mutually beneficial cooperation between Türkiye and European countries is both feasible and sustainable when based upon institutional trust.
One important example is the ongoing Eurofighter Typhoon procurement process, particularly the strategic dialogue developed with the United Kingdom following the signing of the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding. This process illustrates how defence diplomacy can continue even during periods of broader political disagreement.
Another notable example is the construction of TCG Anadolu, developed through extensive cooperation with the Spanish shipbuilding company Navantia. The project demonstrates that technology transfer, joint production, and industrial cooperation can generate long-term strategic benefits for both sides.
Similarly, the T129 ATAK attack helicopter programme, implemented in partnership with the Italian defence company Leonardo, represents another successful model of industrial collaboration. These projects collectively demonstrate that when political disputes are prevented from dominating defence cooperation, high-technology partnerships based on mutual confidence can produce significant strategic outcomes (Kurç et al., 2024).
Conclusion
Political disagreements involving France, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus have frequently influenced the European Union’s collective decision-making processes regarding Türkiye. In particular, the unanimity principle within the Common Foreign and Security Policy has enabled certain member states to prioritize bilateral disputes over the Union’s broader strategic interests. Consequently, defence industrial projects that have proven successful at the bilateral level have often failed to evolve into comprehensive institutional cooperation between Türkiye and the European Union (Efe, 2007; Hürsoy, 2005).
Nevertheless, expecting these longstanding disagreements to be resolved through unilateral concessions is unrealistic. Instead, both sides should seek to construct a new framework of strategic partnership that complements rather than contradicts their respective understandings of strategic autonomy.
Türkiye’s seventy-year contribution to NATO, its participation in operations ranging from Korea to Kosovo, and its position as one of the Alliance’s principal military contributors continue to constitute indispensable elements of European security. At the same time, the European Union has often interpreted Türkiye’s multidimensional foreign policy primarily through a perspective of strategic distrust, while Türkiye’s efforts to diversify defence partnerships have largely emerged in response to restrictions encountered within European defence cooperation itself (Yücel, 2023).
As the international security environment becomes increasingly fragile, defence industrial cooperation between Türkiye and the European Union should be regarded not only as an economic opportunity but also as a geopolitical and geostrategic necessity. Defence industrial collaboration cannot be separated from foreign policy. Rather, the tensions generated by competing interpretations of strategic autonomy make the Türkiye–EU relationship an important case study for understanding the future interaction between strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty, and security interdependence.
Ultimately, interpreting both the European Union’s strategic autonomy agenda and Türkiye’s indigenous defence industrialisation strategy as projects of absolute independence risks deepening existing divisions. A more realistic and sustainable approach would recognize that strategic autonomy and mutual interdependence are not contradictory concepts. Instead, when supported by institutional trust and long-term technological cooperation, they can become complementary pillars of a renewed Türkiye–European Union strategic partnership. This perspective has the potential to transform defence industrial cooperation into one of the most promising foundations for the future of Türkiye–EU relations in an increasingly uncertain international security environment.
References
Efe, H. (2007). The European Union’s evolving European Security and Defence Policy and Türkiye [AB’nin gelişen Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma politikası ve Türkiye]. Gazi University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, 9(3), 127–145.
European Commission. (2024). European Defence Industrial Strategy. Publications Office of the European Union.
European Policy Centre. (2025). Could Defence Cooperation Generate a Spillover Effect for Türkiye–EU Relations? European Policy Centre.
Hürsoy, S. (2005). Türkiye–European Union relations in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy [Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma politikası kıskacında Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri]. Journal of Security Strategies, 1(1), 33–47.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2024). Türkiye’s Peripheral Role in European Defence-Industrial Collaboration Since the End of the Cold War. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025). Türkiye’s Defence-Industrial Relationships with Other European States. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Kurç, Ç. (2026). The paradox of indigenisation: Reading the Turkish defence industry through the perspective of three industrial phases and four technological levels [Yerlilik paradoksu: Türk savunma sanayisini üç sanayi ve dört kademe perspektifinden okumak]. Global Akademi.
Kurç, Ç., Egeli, S., Güvenç, S., & Mevlütoğlu, A. (2024). From Client to Competitor: The Rise of Türkiye’s Defence Industry. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Presidency of Defence Industries. (2024). 2024–2028 Strategic Plan. Presidency of Defence Industries.
Tan, Ö. (2021). European Union and Türkiye: Security and defence relations [Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye güvenlik ve savunma ilişkileri]. Nobel Academic Publishing.
Yücel, Z. (2023). Türkiye–European Union relations from the perspective of the European Union’s security and defence policy [Avrupa Birliği’nin güvenlik ve savunma politikası perspektifinden Türkiye-AB ilişkileri]. Efe Akademi Publishing.
Part III. The Ankara Factor: How Türkiye Is Reshaping Europe’s Defense Architecture
By Ezio Sorti
For years, Türkiye occupied an awkward position in Western security thinking: indispensable to NATO, yet increasingly at odds with European political sensibilities. That perception is now changing rapidly: the war in Ukraine and growing doubts over the United States’ long-term commitment to European security have exposed Europe’s fragilities and lack of preparedness for potential conflicts, forcing governments across the continent to reassess many of their assumptions about who their most reliable partners truly are. In this context, Ankara, long dismissed as a difficult neighbor on the continent’s edge, is looking rather different these days: a serious military-industrial player that Europe can no longer afford to overlook.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the defence relationship quietly taking shape between Italy and Türkiye. In March 2025, Leonardo and Baykar signed a memorandum of understanding in Rome to develop unmanned aerial systems together. By June, at the Paris Air Show, that agreement had a name: LBA Systems. But this goes beyond two companies working together on a product, since it points to something larger: a real strategic partnership between Rome and Ankara, and, behind it, a gradual European realization that Turkish defence capabilities may need to be part of Europe’s security system rather than kept outside of it.
Europe’s Strategic Awakening and the Role of Ankara
The war in Ukraine exposed not only Europe’s military vulnerabilities, but also the fragility of its industrial base. For decades, most of Europe operated on the quiet assumption that the United States would ultimately guarantee the continent’s security. Under the current Trump administration, that assumption no longer holds: not only the threats towards Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, but also the possibility of removing or reallocating some of the US military bases on the continent. Even if European countries still possess deep technological expertise, in most cases they lack the production speed, industrial scale, and political flexibility that prolonged geopolitical competition demands: this is precisely where Türkiye has become increasingly relevant.
The roots of Turkish defence ambition go back further than Bayraktar’s moment of fame. In the early 2000s, Ankara began a serious push toward defence modernization. By 2004, Türkiye’s Executive Committee of Defence Industries had canceled acquisition projects of foreign weaponry worth some $11 billion, redirecting that ambition toward building national industrial capacity. The strategy paid off over time. Indeed, Türkiye has since built one of NATO’s most dynamic military-industrial ecosystems, growing steadily and with clear strategic purpose. The rise of Baykar, and the visibility the Bayraktar TB2 gained since the early phases of the war in Ukraine, came to symbolize a model of warfare Europe had largely set aside: affordable, rapidly deployable systems, produced at scale and proven in the field.
How did Europe and Türkiye end up in such different places? The answer has a lot to do with geography and lived experience. Ankara never fully let go of the logic of hard power, and it had good reasons not to. Decades of operating in one of the world’s most unstable neighborhoods, with conflicts spreading across the Middle East, persistent tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, and domestic insurgency to manage, kept military readiness at the center of Turkish strategic thinking in a way it simply was not for much of Western Europe, still convinced it was living at the “end of history.” Defence manufacturing in Türkiye also carries a political and cultural weight that has no real equivalent in Europe. Perhaps no detail captures this more vividly than the fact that Selçuk Bayraktar, one of Baykar’s leading figures, married Sümeyye Erdoğan, daughter of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in 2016. The personal overlap between political power and industrial ambition is not incidental.
The Rome-Ankara Agreement: Towards a European Defense Beyond Brussels
Against this backdrop, Italy has emerged as one of the most vocal European advocates for deeper engagement with Türkiye. Rome has come to understand that geopolitical competition will lean not only on technological sophistication, but on speed, scalability, and industrial flexibility. The Leonardo-Baykar partnership reflects exactly this logic: Italian expertise in electronics, sensors, and aerospace integration paired with Türkiye’s ability to produce operational platforms quickly and at competitive cost. Baykar’s acquisition and relaunch of Piaggio Aerospace, another Italian company, pushed the relationship further still, with the Turkish company stating that the acquisition is set to expand its influence in the European aviation market. For Baykar, it was both an industrial move and a way through the door: Turkish defence firms have long run into political and regulatory walls in Europe, and a foothold in Italy offered a way around them. In short, what is quietly taking shape is a meaningful transformation of Europe’s defence architecture, driven not by grand vision but by practical necessity, as cooperation with Türkiye moves beyond isolated arms sales and NATO coordination toward something that looks increasingly like genuine industrial integration.
Italy is not alone in moving in this direction. Britain has expanded defence ties with Ankara through Eurofighter negotiations and broader military coordination. Spain has deepened aerospace partnerships with Turkish firms. Taken together, these threads point toward a new kind of alignment among mid-sized powers looking for greater strategic autonomy in a world that no longer arranges itself neatly around blocs and guarantors. Europe’s future defence architecture is unlikely to be built in Brussels; it is already taking shape through bilateral agreements, industrial partnerships, and networks of states bound together by concrete capability rather than political vision. Formal integration between the EU and Ankara may remain a distant prospect, and friction between Brussels and Türkiye will not disappear, but strategic necessity moves faster than political consensus. In practice, Türkiye is edging its way into a de facto European defence system, piece by piece.
The question, then, is no longer whether Türkiye will have a role in Europe’s evolving security order. It is how far Europe is genuinely prepared to go in accepting that part of its future defence capacity may rest, in no small measure, on Ankara.