A 43-kilometer road, yet heavy with the weight of an entire strategic history for Iran. Passing through Armenia’s Syunik province, this road now bears the name “Trump Route” and is placed under U.S. control, its security likely ensured by Blackwater. The Islamic Republic’s ideological policies —both in the Middle East and in the Caucasus—have produced one clear result: Iran’s exclusion from all vital regional and international corridors.
Previous Agreements and Russia’s Changing Role
It is well known that Armenia and Azerbaijan had previously signed a peace agreement, and even before that, in the 2020 Moscow agreement, both countries, in Article 9 of the statement, affirmed the priority and authority of Russian FSB forces to secure this corridor. This, of course, was alongside the Lachin Corridor issue, and although Lachin became inoperable, Russia still hoped to hold the upper hand in the Zangezur chokepoint.
However, this did not happen. Azerbaijan’s diplomatic disputes, such as the case of its diplomats in Yekaterinburg, the downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft, and Moscow’s failure to issue an official apology – combined with Baku’s post-Karabakh rapprochement with Turkey and the European Union- gradually created common ground between Baku and Yerevan in the effort to “de-Russify” the South Caucasus.
Armenia’s Path Away from Moscow
Despite numerous internal challenges, including repeated but unsuccessful coup attempts against Pashinyan, strong opposition from the Sarkisian and Kocharyan factions, and the arrest of Archbishop Gasltanyan, Armenia has remained determined to reduce Russia’s role.
Although Armenia had suspended –but not withdrawn from-the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and although around 5,000 Russian soldiers remain stationed at Gyumri and Base 102, and despite reduced arms imports from Russia, a large volume of Russian exports still flows to Armenia, which, like Georgia, remains dependent on Moscow for energy.
However, by signing a comprehensive joint agreement in 2024 with Georgia and in 2025 with the Netherlands and the United States, and by concluding a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, Yerevan began the process of distancing itself from Russia. Russian forces had already withdrawn from Zvartnots airport, and EU monitoring forces had been deployed on the Iran–Armenia border, but Moscow still maintains political influence in Yerevan.
Azerbaijan’s Conditions and Time Pressure
Within the peace process, Armenia must meet two Azerbaijani conditions –dissolving the Minsk Group and amending its constitution– by April 2026, as parliamentary elections will be held in June that year. This creates the possibility of pro-Russian forces, similar to Ivanishvili’s faction in Georgia, regaining power.
Azerbaijan, for its part, has signaled Moscow by drawing closer to Europe and even supporting Ukraine’s resistance. Recent Russian strikes on SOCAR fuel depots in Ukraine were a mild sign of Kremlin displeasure, though Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova tried to put a positive spin on the Washington peace statement to avoid affecting the planned Trump–Putin meeting in Alaska.
That Alaska meeting may be symbolic in itself: once Russian territory, now hosting the two leaders, and possibly producing a U.S. green light for Moscow’s annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea in exchange for Russian silence on the South Caucasus. But the essential question here is, what is Iran’s position, or what will it be?
Iran’s Gradual Removal from Corridors
Step by step, Iran has been excluded from local, regional, and international transit corridors. The 25-year agreement with China is stalled; Beijing has invested only $60 million in Iran’s transit sector and still disputes Chabahar Port with India and Iran. Meanwhile, the 10-year Chabahar agreement is also stuck, with the port nearly dormant amid India’s silence.
Even more telling, China buys Iranian oil at a 30% discount with a two-year repayment period. A former head of Iran’s Article 90 Parliamentary Commission once admitted, “We need internet filtering and control systems, and we sell oil to get these systems from China.” In other words, a barter of oil for censorship technology. And while Beijing invests close to $52 billion in Pakistan, it offers little of substance to its “partner” Iran.
Meanwhile, Iran still cannot repair and equip its North–South Corridor infrastructure. The Chabahar–Zahedan railway remains unfinished; the Astara–Rasht line, a key link in the North–South route, is idle; container transit tariffs are higher than those of its northern neighbors. This dysfunction went so far that India sent wheat aid to Afghanistan via Pakistan and even China, bypassing Iran entirely.
Comparing Trade Volumes
Iran’s trade with Azerbaijan is worth $583 million, and with Armenia $400 million, while Russia’s exports to these countries reach $2.5 billion and $8 billion, respectively. Iran has leased Russia’s Solyanka port, but only 11% of its trade passes through there; Iran’s Amirabad and Anzali ports cannot operate at full capacity.
Russia, like India and China, has promised investments that have yet to materialize, even as these same countries sign major deals with Gulf states, invest heavily there, lift visa restrictions, and even side with the UAE’s claim to Iran’s three islands.
In the Caspian Sea legal regime, Iran suffered setbacks at the hands of Russia. Moscow also tried to pull Tehran into the Ukraine war; although Iran did not recognize Russia’s occupation, it effectively acted as a military partner.
Alternative Corridors That Bypass Iran
India’s IMEC project bypasses Iran, as does Saudi participation. The Zangezur Corridor, under U.S. supervision, also sidelines Tehran from the 3+3 Caucasus format. Even Azerbaijan’s proposal for an “Aras Corridor” into Iran has been left dormant.
Meanwhile, Turkey is advancing its Faw–Europe rail link with French company Alstom, creating a 2,000-kilometer route to Europe. India is investing heavily in the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, linking Afghanistan to Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, and working with China to secure its trade routes.
Oil and Geopolitics
There is also the prospect of connecting northeastern Syria’s oil pipeline to Iraq’s Kirkuk line, enabling exports through Turkey. Azerbaijani investment in Syria could be part of this larger plan, which includes Turkey, but Ankara worries that U.S. presence there could dilute its influence.
The result is a deepening of Iran’s strategic and economic isolation. Flawed economic policies, the absence of binding agreements with key partners, lack of trust, and global trade disengagement have stripped Iran of all economic benefits.
Zangezur in the U.S.–Europe–Russia–China Contest
The Zangezur Corridor represents U.S. and Western efforts to penetrate Russia’s backyard and contain China. But in this geopolitical maneuvering, it is Iran that, through its own misguided regional policies, has driven itself into irrelevance.
Israel is opening embassies across Central Asia; Mossad is active there; and India is establishing bases in Tajikistan and outmaneuvering China in Afghanistan. In March, 50 rabbis met with Trump to discuss extending the Abraham Accords into Central Asia, while the European Union met with Central Asian leaders to pressure Turkey over Cyprus. Efforts to create alternatives to Russian fuel supplies are another reason Europe stands firmly with the U.S. on Zangezur.
Even the Kashmir issue has been viewed by some as an attempt to create a “Zangezur-like” access to Afghanistan, something China –through Pakistan– has so far blocked.
Pakistan’s Double Game
Pakistan, in aligning with the U.S., undermines Iran’s pipeline projects while exploiting CPEC. Islamabad uses ties with Washington both to leverage its China-backed corridor and to punish India.
Turkey, which had hoped Armenia would honor Pashinyan’s promises on Zangezur, was blindsided when the 99-year U.S. lease emerged –proof that Washington insists on direct involvement and will not allow Ankara to dominate the Caucasus.
Israel: The Quiet Beneficiary
This route will also reassure Israel: 25% of its energy comes from Central Asia, the rest from Azerbaijan. Linking Israel to such corridors, combined with Iraqi and Syrian routes, shifts the balance in its favor. Israel’s gas fields are partnered with SOCAR, which, together with ExxonMobil, is expected to play a role in Zangezur’s energy and transit operations.
Conclusion: Iran on the Margins of the Geopolitical Chessboard
Beyond the Iran–Israel conflict, a new order is emerging in which U.S. and EU presence in the Caucasus and Caspian secures Israel’s position while tightening Iran’s economic siege.
Despite this, some Iranian officials push for greater tensions. Yet at a moment when Israel has struck Iran, destroyed its proxy forces, and continues its Gaza offensive unchallenged, should Tehran not turn back to its own people and replace ideological policy with realism? Current strategies risk excluding Iran from transport routes in Iraq and Lebanon; with a passive Hashd al-Shaabi and Hezbollah, Tehran will lack the tools to compete with Israel.
The smartest move would be to join with neighbors in regional cooperation, avoid falling behind in peace talks, and ease domestic repression to open at least one breathing corridor for the country.
Final Warning
Although the West’s primary target may be China, its neighbors and partners, including Iran, will feel the pain first. Pakistan and Afghanistan have already sought to adapt, but Iran’s role remains ambiguous. If alternative routes through Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iraq are cut, there will be no hope for recovery.
Compare this with Israel’s planned tunnel from the Negev toward Gaza as an alternative to the Suez Canal, or the potential 99-year lease of northern Oman by the U.S. and the UK: Iran would lose control over energy routes despite occupying one of the most strategic locations for these corridors.